TASK FORCE RUSSIA -- REPORT 17 MARCH-16 APRIL 1993 18TH REPORT

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

REPORT TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, U.S.-RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAs

23 APRIL 1993

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

This report has been prepared for the use of the Commission in pursuit of our mission. While it is an unclassified document in accordance with Department of Defense classification guidelines for POW/MIA information, it nonetheless contains casualty-related information and should not be disseminated outside of Commission channels pending efforts by the Department of Defense Executive Agent to locate and notify as many of the next of kin as feasible.

BIWEEKLY REPORT ON SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

TASK FORCE RUSSIA (POW/MIA)

Period of Report: 17 March--16 April 1993

1. SUMMARY: The April plenary session of the Joint Commission formed the highlight of this reporting period (for transcripts and related products see annexes A through E). In the course of these Moscow meetings, the Russian side turned over powerful POW/MIA documentation from the Vietnam War era, which, according to the Russians, originated at the highest levels of the Vietnamese government. This document claimed that the actual number of U.S. POWs held by the North Vietnamese was 1205. While further analysis and substantiation of this documentation are required, Russian co-chairman Colonel-General Dmitri Volkogonov believes it to be authentic. Further, the U.S. side presented an aggressive program of documentation and analysis intended to help the Russian side focus its research efforts in the most promising areas, such as the issue of the transport of U.S. Korean War POWs to Soviet territory and the issue of possible Cold War shootdown survivors who may have been imprisoned in the Soviet camp system. The U.S. side of the Joint Commission also visited Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania en route to Moscow, where the governments consistently sought to be helpful and the local media widely disseminated news of the Joint Commission and its purpose. Some leads, detailed below, have already been forthcoming. Task Force Russia-Moscow (TFR-M) was heavily involved in supporting the plenary session but nonetheless managed to carry out a wide range of interviews and research. Task Force Russia-Washington (TFR-W) produced a series of supporting documents and a videotape for presentation to the Russian side. Additionally, TFR-W deployed teams to the Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) to manage the visit of two Russian subject matter experts in support of future joint operations, and to Israel to conduct an interview with Mr. Avraham Shifrin, a former Gulag inmate, who provided first-hand knowledge of a possible U.S. lieutenant in the Soviet camp system in 1952, as well as hearsay information and a lead concerning transport of U.S. Korean War POWs to the former USSR.

2. UPDATE ON ISSUES FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS:

A. While in Lithuania, members of the U.S. delegation to the Joint Commission met with parliamentarian Balys Gajauskas. Mr. Gajauskas repeated his previous statements about encountering a U.S. officer in the camp system in the Balkash area in the 1950's. A nuance emerged in his story, however, that previously had not been clear to TFR. Mr. Gajauskas stated that, while the U.S. officer had. indeed, been captured by the Red Army in North Korea, this had happened not during the Korean War but in the closing days of WWII as the Red Army descended over much of the Japanese-occupied Far East.

B. In addition to being promised continued access to the Podol'sk archives, the U.S. side received a further Russian commitment to open access to the former Soviet Naval archives in St. Petersburg to assist in the resolution of Cold War shootdown issues.

C. MG (Retd) Fesenko, former senior adviser to North Vietnam's air and air defense forces (1972-73), passed his annotated map of the Hanoi area to representatives of TFR-M. This map, which shows U.S. aircraft shootdown/crash sites from the latter phases of the Vietnam War, was forwarded to Washington for detailed analysis by subject matter experts. Fesenko stated that he had informed General Volkogonov that, while they were in Vietnam, the Soviet advisors filed quarterly and annual reports which should have become part of the archival record. Fesenko suggested that these reports could possibly contain information relevant to the work of the Joint Commission.

[MSG CITE; AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 261842Z MAR 93]

D. The Deputy Director of the Podol'sk archives, Colonel Luchkin, remarked in the course of a meeting with TFR-M that he now believes that most of the information the U.S. side needs is in the archives of the former KGB. Luchkin said that his own informal requests for information from the former KGB archives "had not been answered yes or no." Luchkin also stated that he did not believe it would be particularly beneficial to station a U.S. researcher at Podol'sk full time, since "there would be nothing for them to do at Podol'sk." Luchkin supports the current practice of weekly visits to the archives by TFR-M. [MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 060913Z APR 93]

3. EVENTS, INTERVIEWS, CONTACTS, AND MEETINGS ATTENDED:

A. In the course of the Joint Commission meeting in Moscow, members of the U.S. delegation travelled to the previously-restricted Museum of Air Defense Forces on the afternoon of 8 April. Located deep within a closed web of military bases approximately fifty minutes east of Moscow on the south side of the highway to Vladimir, the museum occupies approximately 4,000 square feet on parts of two floors in a combination officer's club and community center. The ground floor is devoted to the period from the Revolution and Civil War through the Russian triumph in WWII. The second floor contains exhibits ranging from Cold War shootdown information (limited) through displays highlighting air defense assistance to "fraternal' nations such as Syria, Egypt and Vietnam, to sports achievements. Of particular note for TFR-M were a series of photographs and an "honor roll" book with the names of officers who had served in allied states such as Korea and Vietnam. TFR-W representatives extracted the following names from the display:

(1) LTC (Retd) Grigoriy Djagarov, who served in Korea from January 1953 to December 1954 as commander of an air defense artillery battery credited with shooting down three F86s. A museum staff member stated that Djagarov is alive and living in Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk under the Soviet regime).

(2) MG Yevgeniy Osipovich Rogov may have served in Vietnam.

(3) Col Vadim Petrovich Shchbakov served as a senior lieutenant pilot officer-instructor in Vietnam in 1966. He is credited with 10 air-to-air engagements and six shootdowns. A photograph of him was dated May, 1991.

(4) Col Yuriy Grigorevich Tostov served in Vietnam for December 1973 to December 1974 as a specialist for anti-aircraft missile launchers.

(5) Most, if not all, of the above-named officers were representatives to the All-Army Conference of Military Internationalists, the first session of which occurred on 22 May 1991.

B. TFR-M interviewed MG (Retd) Sergei Vasilevich Kapalkin, former Soviet all-services military attache in Hanoi, 1967-1972. Kapalkin said he had little information on U.S. POWs. He had seen POWs only once, when the North Vietnamese organized a propaganda event in late 1968 or early 1969. According to Kapalkin, he had no knowledge regarding the interrogation of U.S. POWs by Soviet personnel or of alleged transfers of POWs to the former Soviet Union.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 051740Z APR 93]

C. Mr. Mikhail Leshtchinsky, Chairman of Bell *(Kolokol)* TV, contacted TFR-M with a proposal for a videotape interview with a source Leshtchinksky claimed was a retired colonel of Aviation who worked in a technical bureau in 1950; further, an American pilot who was shot down in Korea supposedly worked in this bureau. While such an interview might be of real interest to TFR, the publicity-seeking terms proposed by Leshtchinsky made it ethically impossible for TFR-M to participate. The Russian side also declined, reasoning that Leshtchinsky simply wanted to use Joint Commission representatives as "extras" for his own production. TFR-M will continue to attempt to identify the source in question, but without compromising the integrity of either TFR or the Joint Commission.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 261653Z MAR 93]

D. TFR-M met with former Soviet prison guard Grigoriy Nikolayevich Minayev at his residence in St. Petersburg (Ulitsa Podvoyskogo, D.29. Korpus 1, Apt. 164, telephone: 812-583-3116). Minayev claimed that a guard from another battalion who worked at the maximum security prison in Mozindur (Mezhador), Komi ASSR, told him in September 1983 of an American Korean War POW held there. Additionally, Minayev said that his warrant officer training courses mentioned that foreign inmates were held in Syktykvar during the '50s and '60s. Minayev later served as a guard at the inter-oblast MVD/KGB hospital (ITK-12) in St. Petersburg, where he claims to have seen foreign inmates brought in for treatment in a restricted hospital wing as recently as three years ago.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 281821Z MAR 93]

E. TFR-M interviewed Mr. Grigoriy Isidorovich Lyubenetsky in an attempt to identify the "odd man out" in the Vietnam group photo provided by Il'inykh, who claimed that his father identified the man as an American POW. Lyubenetsky, a comrade of Il'inykh's father, could not identify the purported American, but had no difficulty identifying everyone else in the photo. Lyubenetsky served as a senior technical adviser in one of three surface-to-air missile batteries assigned to train the North Vietnamese in SAM operations. During his tenure in North Vietnam--from June 1965 through May 1966--the SAM units were operated exclusively by the Soviets. Lyubenetsky claimed that his battery shot down 28 U.S. aircraft, mostly F-105s, but some F-101s and F-4s as well. He spoke proudly of the day in the autumn of 1965 when his battery downed five F-105s in a single day near Yen Bai. He said there were no U.S. survivors from this action. Lyubenetsky claimed that the Vietnamese always collected everything, including body parts, from the crash sites and send most "trophies" to museums. On one occasion, he stated, he was shown the ID card of a 23-year-old American pilot at a crash site (he does not recall any further information on this incident). Lyubenetsky recalled only one occasion upon which he saw U.S. POWs. In February or March of 1966, he lay ill in the "main hospital" in Hanoi. A group of 10 to 15 blindfolded POWs were brought to the hospital by truck for examination. Lyubenetsky believes that some were injured. He saw these POWs from the window of his hospital room at a distance of over 50 meters. He does not know what became of these POWs thereafter. Lyubenetsky also provided several leads which TFR-M will pursue.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 291545Z MAR 93]

F. TFR-M met with former Senior Lieutenant Genadiy Yakovich Shelomytov, who had served in a SAM battery in Vietnam from 1966 to 1967. Shelomytov stated that he had no contact with live U.S. POWs, but that he had seen the remains of one American pilot at a crash site. He claims the experience upset him to the point where he avoided all crash sites in the future. He recalls that the Vietnamese, however, carefully gathered up all of the remains and relics from every crash site. Shelomytov also provided TFR-M with the names (and some phone numbers) of other Vietnam veterans who served with the Briansk Air Defense Regiment from 1966-67.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 291545Z MAR 93]

G. TFR-M spoke by phone with former sergeant and Soviet Vietnam veteran Nikolai Nikolaivich Kolesnik, the secretary of the Russian Vietnam Veterans Organization headed by General (Retd) Abramov. Kolesnik stated that he saw no point in scheduling a formal interview, since he had never had

any contact with U.S. POWs. He did, however, provide the names of two other leads, which are currently being pursued by TFR-M.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 291545Z MAR 93]

4. SPECIAL SECTION: BALTIC HIGHLIGHTS

[Note: The purpose of this section is to provide TFR-related highlights from the results of the visit of the U.S. delegation to the Joint Commission to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and to fill in operational details. Accounts of formal intergovernmental meetings are reported in Department of State messages, and will not be recapitulated here.]

A. ESTONIA:

(1) On 5 April 1993, Uniformed state police and archivists from the Estonian Interior Ministry, headed by Director Ivar Teeaar (umlauts above "a"s in last name), hosted representatives of the U.S. delegation in the former KGB headquarters in Tallinn. Although the archivists had no immediate knowledge of any files containing information on U.S. POWs, all personnel expressed a full intent to cooperate with the U.S. search. The senior archivist working on the KGB files left behind in Estonia agreed to search for any possible entries reference the crew of the U.S. Navy Privateer shot down over the Baltic in 1950, as well as to remain alert to other information of potential interest. The archivists stated that the condition of the files, as well as their extent, meant that work was proceeding slowly, even on information of immediate concern to Estonia. Mr. Teeaar made a point of giving the U.S. delegation a tour of the basement, where archives are now stored in the cells that once held Estonian prisoners of the KGB. The tour culminated in a visit to a subterranean room that had been used for the execution of political prisoners--making a very sober and telling point on the legacy of Soviet power in Estonia.

(a) The Estonian archivists also provided the names of two unusual archives from the NKVD/MGB eras, suggesting that the U.S. side pursue access to them. Both of these are closed archives hidden within other security services archives. Both concern prisoner utilization and transport. The archives are:

--The Main Directorate of All Government Highways and Roads (1935-53) Archive of the Ministry for Construction and Exploitation of Motor Transport Roads of Russia.

--The Main Directorate of Construction of the Far North (Dalstroy) (1941-53), Unified "Northeast-Gold" Main Directorate for Precious Metals and Diamonds.

(2) In cooperation with the Government of Estonia, the U.S. Embassy sponsored a strong publicity campaign to precede the U.S. delegation's visit. Short term results included three telephone calls and one letter.

(a) Mr. Velja Meos, who had been imprisoned in Omsk from 1950 to 1954, stated that he had worked at a construction site with three Americans. The Americans were imprisoned in a separate camp, but came to the common worksite. Meos, whose English is very limited, does not recall any names; however, he claims he was also held in the same cell as an American in Kazan.

(b) Mr. Lembit Aasalo, who was held near Irkutsk in Osjarlag No. 011 from 1952 to 1954, met a man named "Jimmy Fabian," who claimed to be an American pilot from Chicago. [Note: "Jimmy Fabian" really existed. Upon release from Soviet custody in 1956, he proved to be a Czech national, with no claims on U.S. citizenship.] Mr. Aasalo also stated that, in 1952, he was held in the same cell with a Ukrainian-American with a "three-part-name" that was "something like "-------Norton-Miczkewicz." The Ukrainian-American, according to Mr. Aasalo, claimed to have been kidnapped as a spy in Berlin in 1952.

(c) Mr. Boris Ulbo served in political prisoner camp No. 18 in Mordovia, where he claims to have encountered a U.S. Korean War-era pilot named "Gary" or "Harry." The American was about 180cm tall,

blond with blue eyes, and very good-natured. Mr. Ulbo believes he would recognize him if he saw him in a photo. Mr. Ulbo further stated that, in 1954-55, he was imprisoned with another U.S. POW from Korea who was a tall, dark mulatto.

(d) In a letter, Iraida Arro claimed to have met a Polish-American clergyman (non-POW) in the camp system in the mid--1950s.

(e) An official source also suggested that U.S. representatives contact Mr. Endel Liiv of Parnu, Estonia (tel: 40080), who might have information of the 8 April 1950 Privateer shootdown over the Baltic.

[MSG CITE: STAFF OFFICER NOTES; AND AMEMBASSY TALLINN 021507Z APR 93]

B. LATVIA:

(1) Due to aircraft refueling difficulties in Tallinn, the U.S. delegation arrived in Riga, Latvia with approximately a four-hour delay. Due to the tight nature of the itinerary, this reduced the amount of contact with Latvian officials and sources. Nonetheless, the Government of Latvia stated its intention to help further the Joint Commission's work to the best of its abilities. Of special note was a conversation between the Director, TFR, Mr. Denis Clift, Chief of Staff, DIA, and Colonel Jurus Vectrans, Chief of the Latvian Police. Colonel Vectrans told of his own memories and those of acquaintances in regard to the 8 April 1950 Privateer shootdown. Vectrans stated that the planes that shot down the Privateer took off from the local base at Liepaya and that, upon their return, the Russian pilots were reported to have been laughing because they "shot down a big plane and it was easy." Vectrans said that there were widespread rumors concerning the crash, and that, in the coastal region, all roads were blocked. At the end of a week, the security services were said to have "caught U.S. spies." Vectrans said that the KGB (MGB) had definitely played the leading role in this closure and search. Vectrans promised aid in contacting others who might have more information, and raised the name of Markvaris Talivaldis, Vangayu 30-M, Riga (tel: 228314). Vectrans also volunteered random information of related interest, such as that, in his experience, MVD camps and KGB camps definitely existed in parallel systems; and that Latvian POW and missing persons organizations were actively involved in tracing the fates of their fellow citizens.

(2) Amembassy Riga also developed a publicity campaign in advance of the U.S. delegation's arrival, and received four letters in response. These letters are currently being translated by embassy officers and will be forwarded to TFR.

[MSG CITE: STAFF OFFICER NOTES; AND AMEMBASSY RIGA 080459Z APR 93]

C. LITHUANIA

(1) The working-level highlight of the stop in Vilnius, Lithuania, was a meeting in the parliament building with Parliamentarian Balys Gajauskas, who expanded upon and clarified statements he had made on an earlier TFR-M videotape concerning his contact with an American officer in the camp system. Gajauskas said he had met an American named "Viktor Sheffer" in a mining camp in the Balkash area, where both men worked as electricians. Gajauskas said that he met Sheffer on the latter's second day in camp, and that the American was amiable and freely admitted that he had worked for U.S. intelligence in the Far East. The purported American said that the Red Army had captured him in norther Korea in the closing days of WWII, where he had been working behind the Japanese lines. The American either was or had been a U.S. Navy officer. [Note: The profile of Viktor Sheffer suggests he may have been a Navy officer who transitioned to the OSS in the course of WWII]. Gajauskas remembered that the American spoke Korean, Japanese and Chinese, as well as some German and Russian. The American used to speak in Korean and Japanese to other camp inmates. Although Sheffer was an ethnic German, German seemed to be his weakest foreign language. Gajauskas is not certain, but believes he remembers Sheffer stating that he was from the northern part of the United States, and that he had originally served in a closed camp in the Soviet Far East, then was brought to Karaganda, then Balkash. After Stalin's death, the American was moved. Gajauskas also recalled casual contact with an American in the camp system in Mordovia about 1956. This American had his own friends who spoke English with him. He claimed to be a major

who had been kidnapped in Berlin. In 1956, the American disappeared and rumor had it that he was repatriated. [Note: This "American" could have been "Jimmy Fabian" or one of a number of other East Europeans who claimed U.S. citizenship and/or military rank while in the camp system.] Gajauskas stated that he never actually spoke with this second American. Asked for advice to further the Commission's research, Gajauskas recommended that the U.S. side continue talking to former political prisoners, both in Russia and in the newly- independent states, and that the U.S. side seeks publicity through memorial-type organizations, especially those with their own newspapers or newsletter. Gajauskas stated that every prison kept its own personnel files, which were held "forever," and that each camp had its own "board" in charge of the files. He said that, when many prisoners were released in 1956, many of the files might have been moved. He stated that, when fellow-parliamentarian Martieke (as heard) went to Moscow to negotiate the return of camp records to Lithuania, the Russians said, "We'll give them back, but you'll have to find them--and it's going to cost a lot." The Government of Kazakhstan, on the other hand, stated it would be glad to turn over any records on Lithuanians held on Kazakh territory, but that it could not locate them. Gajauskas said that the camp administrators kept records on many minor details, such as illnesses. He stated that closed camps were always KGB, but that "open" camps were run by the MVD with KGB representation. Queried on the reported practice of forcing prisoners to take new names upon entry into the camp system, Gajauskas said that it was usually the other way around, that people in civil society who feared the GULag often changed their own names. Finally, he said that many long-term prisoners were simply settled in remote villages and told to shut up.

(2) Amembassy, Vilnius, working with the Government of Lithuania and the local media, sponsored a vigorous publicity campaign in support of the visit of the U.S. delegation. The initial response included the following interviews and correspondence:

(a) Salamonas Josephas Medaiskis, a survivor of the massacre of the Jews from the Vilnius ghetto on 23 September 1943, stated that 16-18 U.S. airmen in green uniforms with flight caps, including two tall black men, were also executed by the German authorities. Medaiskis stated that he was standing right behind one of the "Americans" when the Nazis and their support troops began machine-gunning everyone. The tall American fell backward onto 13-year-old Medaiskis, knocking him down, after which a number of women and children fell on top of him, as well. Medaiskis remained under the corpses all day, as the Nazis walked about shooting anyone who appeared to be alive. At nightfall, he crawled out from under the corpses, covered in blood, and made his way back to Vilnius, where a Polish-Lithuanian family hid him until the end of the war. Mr. Medaiskis can be reached in Vilnius through his daughter, Mary Medaiskis, at 62-37-95. He spends part of his time in Georgia, with his Georgian wife, where his address in Lakoba 9-93, Aphazia Gagra.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 301254Z MAR 93]

(b) Mr. Algirdas Korsakas (POB: USA, Address: Vileisiu St. 31-14, Vilnius, Tel: 74-27-42) was exiled to the Vorkuta coal mines in 1945. He alleges that an American pilot named "Jonas" (Lithuanian for "John") was held in Shudva Lager, Mine No. 16, in Vorkuta. Although Korsakas did not often see the American, he says that it was common knowledge that Jonas was an American and that he had great difficulty communicating, since he was the only one of 7,000 prisoners who did not share some common language. On one occasion, Jonas communicated to Korsakas through sign language that he, Jonas, was a pilot and that he had been imprisoned by the Soviets at the end of WWII. Jonas liked to play chess and, on occasion, shared a game with Korsakas. In 1949, the American was sent to another camp.

[MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 301254Z MAR 93]

(c) Amembassy Vilnius also received a letter from Mr. Stasys Paulauskas, S. Darius and S. Girenas Street 21-6, Klaipeda. Mr. Paulaskas stated that, while working under a Soviet prison regime in Mueggelheim, Germany in 1947, he learned that a number of American War prisoners were held in a local barracks. A further letter, from Mr. Vladas Songaila of Kursenai, Siauliai District, stated that the author met an American named "Miller" at the Inta Labor Camp No. 1, Komi SSR, in 1950. "Miller" was an English-speaking pilot who spoke a little Russian. At the time, the "American" was about thirty years old. Mr. Songaila met a second American at the Inta Labor Camp No. 5 in 1950. The second American's family

name was "Solman," and he was of Finnish ancestry. This "American" spoke English, Finnish and a little Russian. Mr. Songaila stated that he had no further information. [MSG CITE: AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 301254Z MAR 93]

5. Recommendations:

A. TFR-M, in coordination with Amembassy Moscow, continue to press the Russian side for the Vietnamese-language original document upon which the "1205" Russian-language document is based.

B. TFR-M follow up all by-name leads that emerged in the course of the April plenary session of the Joint Commission.

C. TFR-W and TFR-M begin detailed coordination for the proposed joint expedition to the southern Kuriles in late May or early June.

D. TFR-W coordinate with Amembassy Riga to deploy a two-man interview team to Latvia to follow up leads raised on the 8 April 1950 Privateer shootdown, as well as to interview other Latvians with information on possible Americans within the Soviet camp system.

E. TFR-M coordinate for and deploy a researcher or two-man research team to exploit the Naval Archives in St. Petersburg, with special attention to naval aviation and coastal service records.

F. TFR-M continue to press the Russian side for formal, detailed responses to the documents and video presented to the Russian side during the April plenary session.

G. TFR-M strongly pursue search for retired General Djagadze, who allegedly transported eight U.S. pilot-POWs from Korea to the USSR. [Note: see Annex D of this report for additional information.]

ANNEX A TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA BIWEEKLY REPORT, 27 MAR--16 APR 1993

SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT OF 8 APRIL 93 PLENARY SESSION OF THE U.S.- RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

1. On 8 April 1993, the Joint Commission met in plenary session in the Oval Hall of the Kremlin. Colonel-General Volkogonov, head of the Russian delegation, stressed that the location demonstrated the great importance Russia attaches to the work of the Joint Commission. Volkogonov stated that the hall was originally used by Czarist ministers and councilors; that Stalin, who kept an apartment in the building, used the hall for key meetings; and that it is now the setting for President Yeltsin's meetings with his Council of Ministers. Agreement had been reached in advance that General Volkogonov would chair this, the first day's session, and that Ambassador Toon, head of the U.S. delegation, would chair the second day's (concluding) session. The 8 April meeting began at 0958.

2. General Volkogonov opened the session with welcoming remarks on behalf of President Yeltsin, stating that the Russian side was committed to carrying on the work of the Joint Commission to the end. Volkogonov noted that this was the fourth plenary session of the Joint Commission, and that it had been one year since the meeting that initiated the Commission's work. Volkogonov reviewed earlier agreements to pursue specific ends: the uncovering of pertinent information on (1) World War II, (2) the Cold War, (3) Korea, and (4) Vietnam. He then moved on to summarize the current state of knowledge on these issues as viewed from the Russian side.

A. On the subject of World War II, Volkogonov noted that:

(1) The Red Army liberated 22,454 U.S. POWs held by the Germans. Of these, the vast majority were repatriated. Three of those liberated died in Odessa; of these, two sets of remains were repatriated, but the fate of the third set of remains was according to Volkogonov, unclear.

(2) 76 U. S. citizens were held in Soviet camps . Of these, 72 were repatriated "sooner or later, " while 4 died and were interred in the Tambov area.

(3) 730 U.S. pilots were interned, but all of them returned home.

(4) The Russian side considers all WWII questions answered with the exception of a few graves.

(5) The Russian side proposed a May-June trip to the Kurile Islands to look for the graves of reported U.S. POWs held by the Japanese. Volkogonov noted the political sensitivity of this issue vis-a-vis Japan. He stressed, however, that this territory was administered by the Japanese when the deaths in question took place. In the Russian view, it is necessary to dispatch a team of experts to resolve this issue.

B. On the subject of the Cold War shootdowns, Volkogonov stated:

(1) "We are still working on this... It's difficult because these times are long gone. We are talking about the special services of both sides, and about crimes of the Stalin regime. We gave you documents showing 41 U.S. citizens still living or who lived on Soviet territory. Five are still alive, as you know. They were taken from Poland, from the Baltics and elsewhere. Now everything is clear about these people."

(2) "There are now six U.S. persons in Russia who stayed voluntarily. These are not POWs. Earlier, there were more such people. Times were different."

(3) "The most difficult question pertaining to the Cold War is the matter of shootdowns. The U.S. side has asked us to look at 10 cases, although there were more incidents over the territory of the USSR and adjacent waters in the Fifties and Sixties. We have here a large folder with exact details. It seems there are two problem areas where the U.S. side has serious questions and complaints..."

(4) "On the 29 July 1953 incident off Vladivostok and the [2 Sept] 1958 incident near Yerevan--the U.S. side believes there were survivors from the first incident...well, maybe one. We are familiar with the arguments, but our efforts did not clarify it yet. I personally talked with the leadership of the Far Eastern fleet, of the fishing fleet. We knew of two U.S. minesweepers in the area--they questioned a Soviet trawler. On the subject of trawlers, we couldn't identify any crew members-- but it's worth continuing work on this."

(5) "On the 1958 Yerevan incident--there were eleven men on board. There were 6-7 sets of remains. The explanation for this is unclear. We ask the U.S. side to give us all available information on this case to help us with our search."

C. On the Korean War issue, Volkogonov said:

(1) "It's important to remember that we're talking about events that occurred on the territory of a third-party state. About U.S. POW transfers to the former Soviet Union--there is no proof to this point that such transfers occurred. We know of press accounts in the U.S. and here. Unfortunately, we have no documentary proof of one or many U.S. POWs on the territory of the USSR. I am not saying the search shouldn't continue..."

(2) "We gave the U.S. side information on the number of camps and POWs in Korea. We gave 71 interrogation reports from sessions where Soviet officers were present. Tomorrow should be devoted entirely to the Korea question because, thanks to the Ministry of Defense Archives, we have found some key documents. These documents are connected to the locations where planes were shot down. There are technical details--time, place, altitude, latitude, longitude...in Podol'sk, we have material to show you during your visit. There are plane numbers and so forth. Tomorrow we'll have a presentation."

D. On the Vietnam War issue, Volkogonov stated:

(1) "What can we say? We've talked about the U.S. defectors who came through third-party states then through the USSR to other third-party states. We gave you the names."

(2) "Our archives search has uncovered seven very important documents from the Politburo archives. Mr. Pekhoia, the Main Archivist of Russia, and I looked at them together. We found very important documents we will share with you now. These contain the numbers, ranks and descriptions of U.S. POWs held in Vietnam. The Vietnamese told the U.S. side they held only 300-- plus POWs...but we've found this document of the Politburo of the Vietnamese Labor Party--why hide it now? It's a delicate issue, but we can't be quiet about it any longer, since it's a humanitarian issue. The official list reported 368 Americans. But there were 1205, in fact. This document has very detailed information, for instance, the number of places--11 camps--and the nature of health and so forth. We will continue our search, but you see, the Central Committee of the USSR knew the exact number of POWs in Indochina. This information was known, although, in the past, the Central Committee denied any knowledge. But we are talking about men's fates--a humanitarian issue. There is no political spin--we want to help the families. I am going to give Ambassador Toon 100 pages." [Note: Actual number of pages turned over on Vietnam was 59.]

(3) "Over the past year, we have done a significant amount of work and, after Ambassador Toon's presentation, we will address the Cold War and Vietnam problems. Note that the Committee's work has been taking place during a difficult time internally for Russia--but we are full of determination to carry out our work to the bitter end. We will keep working in the spirit of the Vancouver summit. One further matter--I've heard of comments from the U.S. side--during hearings in the Senate and in the press--that the Russian side is not open. I say to the Committee that I trust and rely on all Russian members. Nonetheless, I can't exclude the possibility that some facts might still be hidden. We found one instance where an individual was hiding information. Over the coming year, we will try to answer all outstanding questions. Does anyone have any questions now?"

(4) Ambassador Toon noted that there were probably a lot of questions, but that they might better be asked later in the session. General Volkogonov said, "In that case, let's listen to Ambassador Toon."

3. Ambassador Toon began the U.S. presentation by thanking General Volkogonov for the "excellent summary of the past year." Toon then said, "Let me first express our appreciation for the opportunity to meet in these handsome surroundings. It has always been pleasant to meet with you, General Volkogonov, no matter where, but this particular place does underline the significance of our work. As you know, I've been in this building many times, but, frankly, those occasions were not very pleasant. Most of the time I was dealing with Mr. Brezhnev and Gromyko. They were not the most pleasant interlocutors. This is a real change for me being here with you, General Volkogonov, a friend in whom I have confidence. This marks a change in our country's positions and, I hope, this trend will be strengthened in the future. Before beginning our presentation, allow me to introduce Representative Sam Johnson, Republican from Texas. Because of his background, he can make a real contribution. Regrettably, he has personal experience on the subject of POWs. As a fighter pilot in Vietnam, he was shot down and he was in prison for seven years. Our knowledge is academic, his is personal. With your permission, I'll ask him to say a few words."

4. Congressman Johnson said, "General, I can tell you I've heard only good comments on your handling of this issue. The U.S. does consider this important. Another delegation is here dealing with the political situation--and I wish you all the best in that regard. Also, as a fighter pilot, I also fought in the Korean War, so I'm interested in that, too."

5. Ambassador Toon said, "I'd like to comment on your complaint about our criticism of members of the Commission. We never blamed you personally--or any other members of the Commission. From the beginning, we have had complete confidence in you and President Yeltsin, and we felt you and President Yeltsin were absolutely sincere in promising to give us information on POWs. If we have any complaint, it's about the lack of information, that it's less than expected, but it's not about members of the Commission. We have had the feeling that not all the people in your archives are enthusiastic about opening up to us. That is totally understandable. For instance, in the USA, if we asked the FBI to open up all their files, we would not receive an enthusiastic response. So we recognize the problems. But there is

no blame placed on you or your colleagues. Please encourage those serving under you to be more forthcoming. Now we mentioned Podol'sk. The people in Podolsk have been very cooperative and it has been very informative. We look forward to our visit to Podolsk this afternoon. Now, since last we met, we went to Vladivostock, then to Posyet. We ran into a blinding snowstorm. I thought we might have to spend the night in that 'thrilling, beautiful metropolis.' Thanks to your pilots, we got back. So thanks for the arrangements."

A. Ambassador Toon said, "General, in recent months we have conducted extensive research in our State Department's 'Sam Klaus' files. This yielded valuable information on the ten priority Cold War shootdowns. Some strengthens our conviction that several crew members may have survived these incidents. This information will be turned over later. A few weeks ago, we hosted two Russian colleagues at CILHI, in Hawaii. The purpose was to familiarize them with forensic methods we use in Southeast Asia. We assume this knowledge will be useful to the work of the Joint Commission. An integral part of our Indochina effort is remains-identification performed by this group. Our experience in Vietnam shows that the best information comes from interviews or oral history. When the Commission met in September, you arranged for us to meet with two members of the diplomatic corps who had served in Vietnam. Task Force Russia-Moscow interviewed a number of Russians assigned to Vietnam during and after the war. You have our appreciation as regards your efforts to encourage your colleagues to meet with us, and I'd also like to thank the Russians who came forward."

B. Ambassador Toon continued: "As you pointed out, we have accomplished much in the last six months. But there is still much that remains to be done. I hope you will encourage other Russians who served in Indochina to come forward to meet with us. We're working on your information request on aircraft lost near Alaska. An inquiry has been conducted by the JCS encompassing all shootdowns that occurred during the Cold War. I have an interim report of findings I'll pass to you during the break. We need specific dates and locations, as we gave you. Finally, we're doing our best to address your concerns on Afghan POW's. At every one of our meetings with Afghan government officials, we press for information and releases. However, our influence with individuals with the Afghan government and the Mujahedeen is limited. We'll continue to stress this issue. We're also working with the governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and others in the region on this issue. Thus, we have two documents for you on Soviet soldier POWs in Afghanistan. The first is a report compiled in cooperation with several governments and the Red Cross. It contains information on several Soviets and their Afghan captors. The second document regards several former Soviet soldiers who, as of January of this year, were living in the "Black Valley" region of Afghanistan. Both reports are fragmentary, but hopefully useful--it's the best we can do at this time. You can assume we will continue all efforts to resolve the fates of your missing service members. Here, General, are the documents."

C. Ambassador Toon stated, "It's critical that we make progress on the 10 Cold War shootdowns in this meeting. I've met with a number of officials in the new administration, and I had a long conversation with Secretary of State Christopher before our departure. I'll report to the White House on my return. On the basis of conversations in Washington, I can tell you the President has a deep concern on the Cold War shootdown cases. You mentioned additional documents in this area--we'll be glad to receive these documents and we'll analyze them carefully. Meanwhile, the American public cannot understand why you can't be more specific on the shootdowns. If all of the crew members were killed, where are the remains? If there were survivors, where are they and what happened to them? We've prepared a report, which we're ready to present--either now or after the break--I would like to do it now--let me give the floor to Denis Clift, Chief of Staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency."

D. Mr. Clift began by thanking Ambassador Toon, then stated, "The U.S. side comes to this session with high hopes for much more information from the Russian side. We're eager to review the information you're passing to us. As you know, we believe the shooting down of U.S. planes in the Fifties and Sixties would have been of the greatest interest to the Soviet Government and would have been documented and reported to the highest levels. Our work causes us to believe that there would have been survivors from some of these incidents. As a result of research and analysis, we have prepared a handbook addressing each of the Cold War incidents--and a detailed study of five of the incidents. Each case study is a road map for future work and a satisfactory resolution. Major Johnson will brief the 29 July 1953 shootdown.

You'll see that the data from the Podol'sk archive is of tremendous potential. After working with you for more than a year, our work indicates--everywhere we turn, with key officers and retirees with whom we spoke--that very important information remains in the intelligence archives that we have not received so far. We interviewed those involved in the Baltic case, for instance, who told us it was normal for the KGB to do parallel reports to those from the units involved, since the KGB was directly and routinely involved in the prevention of border violations. As Ambassador Toon said, repeatedly, to the Committee and the Russian public, we are humanitarian--we're not interested in seeing intelligence, just data to resolve these cases. Now I'd like to turn the floor over to Major Johnson."

E. Major Pete Johnson of Task Force Russia initiated a briefing on the 29 July 1953 case, with U.S. Navy Lieutenant Gary Tabach interpreting. A large chart/map of the incident area was fixed to the wall and served as a briefing aid. Johnson first oriented the audience to the map and to its depiction of the Soviet air defense zone. Johnson said, "At 0330 hours, on 29 July 1953, an RB-50 reconnaissance aircraft took off from Japan. The original flightplan is highlighted by this green line. At 0541, the radar set on the aircraft stopped working. The aircraft continued until the radar came on again and the aircraft turned to regain its course. At 0559, the aircraft turned again. At 0615, the aircraft was shot down by two Soviet MIGs. The wreckage of the aircraft hit the water here, at 0617. A U.S. search plane from Japan began searching on the afternoon of 29 July. They found nothing, then moved the area of the search closer to the Soviet coast. That afternoon, a U.S. search aircraft sighted Soviet patrol boats in the following numbers at the following places and times: three boats at 1609 moving here; nine boats at 1619 moving here; and three boats at 1636 moving here. At 1740 hours on the 29th, the co-pilot of the RB-50 was sighted in the water here. A rescue aircraft dropped a boat to the co-pilot and the U.S. Navy was called to pick up the co-pilot. A U.S. Navy vessel met Soviet trawler #1423 at 0400 on 30 July. Captain Rochet, the co-pilot, was recovered."

F. General Volkogonov then read the "most interesting" excerpts from a report from Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy Admiral Kuznetsov to Minister of Defense Bulganin. The report stated that, at 0700 local time, Soviet radars found the approaching U.S. aircraft. Two Soviet aircraft were ordered into the air. At 0711, the Soviet planes identified the U.S. aircraft. The Soviet aircraft were then fired on by the U.S. aircraft as they approached. The leading Soviet aircraft was damaged. The following Soviet plane then fired on the U.S. plane. The U.S. plane was shot down about fifteen miles from the island of Askol'd. The Soviet planes landed successfully, but the lead plane was damaged. At 1420, four U.S. rescue aircraft were detected. General Volkogonov said, "And there is one more report to the Minister of Defense. Exactly at 0400 hours, two U.S. minesweepers were in the area. The minesweepers looked for evidence--there were U.S. and Japanese officers involved--it says that here, but I don't know what it means--they tried to get information from our fishermen, but there was nothing of interest...a U.S. ship recovered parts of the plane and the co- pilot. Well, the times coincide, and we see the surveillance was very careful. We'll give you our documents, with photos and other information."

G. LTC Osipov, General Volkogonov's military assistant, said, "The Russian side is interested in what reports were filed about people in the water." Major Johnson responded that, "Two search-and-rescue aircraft saw objects in the water near the wreckage that resembled U.S. survival vests. About six of them."

H. General Volkogonov said, "I want to clarify the matter concerning the patrol boats. Our reports say nothing about this. Our boats couldn't patrol there--it was outside of their patrolling area--well, perhaps they were sent out there intentionally--therefore, it's very important to investigate why they were there so quickly. I ask my colleague from the Border Guards Archives to see if boats were sent out on that day--in fact, I'm asking right now if they were sent out. I completely discharge the possibility that Soviet civilian trawlers could have picked up survivors and hidden them--even though there are no rules on this, I think sailors would have repatriated them. Therefore, it's very important to find out about the patrol boats. Following a fifteen minute break, I want to hear from our Border Guards colleagues and from the Army archives." The break began at 1133. The session resumed at 1153.

6. General Volkogonov said, "Now we will continue with representatives of the Border Troops, Captain First Rank Litvinenko of the Border Guards archives and Major General Zaporoschenko of the Border

Guards."

7. Zaporoschenko said, "Regarding this incident, our archives did careful work on the case of the 29 July 1953 shootdown. At 0645 local radars detected an aircraft violating our airspace over the water. Our aircraft met the U.S. plane, an RB-50, which opened fire. At 0711, answering fire from our aircraft shot the plane down. During the entire day, from 0800 to 2230, U.S. planes sought the exact location of the downed U.S. plane. U.S. ships steamed toward the area. At 0400, Soviet trawler # 423 from Nakhodka met the U.S. military ship #685. The U.S. crew put down a boat with seven sailors--one asked in broken Russian if they had seen anyone in the sea. The Russian trawler gave a negative answer. There were no Soviet ships in the area of the shootdown. Russian Navy ships stayed 5-6 miles from the coast, they didn't leave our territory. We found no information in our archive concerning the fate of the crewmen from this incident."

8. LTC Osipov said, "The U.S. side has a question about this. The U.S. side says there were patrol boats present." Zaporoschenko answered, "The Soviet Border Guards were not equipped with patrol boats, only with light boats for 5-6 kilometers from the coast."

9. Zaporoschenko stated, "This period of work on the names and fates of Americans allows me to say, first, that we have found a number of files in the Russian government and military archives which may contain information on Americans, and, second, there is information on routes, means of transport, convoys, and escort routes from World War II." Volkogonov interrupted, asking, "Can you talk about *this* episode?" Zaporoschenko answered, "Major Johnson is working on a file of 600 cards which is of interest. Johnson took 59 of the cards--unfortunately, we do not have information on the specific topic we are discussing--but we may find it out." Volkogonov said, "Let's discuss information about 29 July."

10. LTC Osipov said, "I listened attentively to the U.S. report. Overall, the U.S. and Soviet information on times coincides. But the location of the shootdown doesn't match. Let's look at the contradictions. The first issue is that, according to our information, the shootdown occurred 8 miles from Askol'd. Secondly, according to U.S. information, two corpses washed ashore in Japan. And, if the co-pilot was picked up here, we can say for sure that the location [of the shootdown] was closer in to Askol'd because of the currents. It's important to establish the exact place. Such a location would involve a violation by the U.S. side--but it's a humanitarian question, the violation is not important. But we need facts. We need the exact location. And the U.S. information is only based on pilot recollections."

11. Ambassador Toon said, "Yes, it's a humanitarian matter--were there survivors? That's the basic question. Were there torpedo boats or not? As a U.S. citizen, I can't understand why one side says there is documentary evidence of boats, while the other side denies it. I ask MG Loeffke, who knows more about this, to explain. General, explain precisely what information exists on the boats and what backs it up."

12. MG Loeffke answered, "First, let me say that the Russian side has been very open, and we're grateful. The reason we chose this case to present is because there's a live survivor and search-and-rescue pilots alive today. The Ambassador asked us to be as detailed as we could. That's why we prepared this book for you--this is the first case in the book. It has both the Russian and U.S. positions. The biggest problem is the matter of the PT boats. By the way, we have 150 pages from the 'Klaus' files with information on this. Let me make a few points from the book. Point One: the man who was rescued was the *last* man out of the aircraft. That means more than 10 crewmembers parachuted before him. That's why we're so sure. Point Two: The search-and-rescue aircraft saw those PT boats going in and out of the wreckage area. This was 8 hours before our pilot was picked up by the U.S. Navy and 16 hours after the shootdown. To our logic, those boats must have picked up something. Point Three: The man we picked up said he felt waves and heard the roar of engines around him. And the last point: The rescued pilot states he heard someone cry out--he never saw the person and never heard him again. You might be right about the location--but it's not our information. We're talking about where our search-and-rescue pilots saw wreckage. General Volkogonov, you saw Sanderson yourself, and this case is widely reported on television. This is out of our hands now because the U.S. media are already reporting the testimony of several live witnesses--and it was not us who gave them the information."

13. General Volkogonov thanked General Loeffke and called on Professor Pekhoia, the Main Archivist of the Russian Federation, stating that Pekhoia was "anxious to say a few words." Pekhoia said, "There are several aspects to this. There are political issues, but they're not important. But, on our reports, you must realize that this information was reported to Bulganin, the Minister of Defense, by the Navy commander. They would not lie to him about prisoners, it is absolutely unbelievable. Now I do not doubt the U.S. side's position, so our mission is to maximally investigate the entire situation about 29 July. Unfortunately, if there were prisoners, the information surely would have been reported to the Minister of Defense. We need more information about the Soviet Navy's activity in the area and more details. One more detail--it's a drawback that we don't find any information about missing aviators. I'll try to clarify my position--there *must* be some information about the fates of U.S. pilots. But, according to the information provided to Bulganin, they didn't find any. But I think we can find something. If pilots were taken, information would have been reported to the Minister of Defense."

14. Ambassador Toon said, "I have two comments. I agree that it's highly unlikely that the Navy commander would lie to Bulganin. I've spent a lot of time here, and I just can't believe pilots who were picked up from the water wouldn't have been reported. But, knowing the old Soviet regime as I did--and do--I do not exclude the possibility that these records have been tampered with--I don't say it was done, but you can't exclude the possibility. In any case, our business is to confirm the issue of survivors. We are only trying to indicate that there *might* have been survivors. We hope you will take our information to further your inquiry into this issue. As General Loeffke pointed out, this is a highly emotional issue in the U.S. and we must do everything we can. I would hope that both sides work hard on this from now on."

15. General Volkogonov responded, "I think it's interesting, this question of the truth. It's a challenge to our intellectual capabilities. Negative factors can influence us. Perhaps all of the pilots *were* killed. We don't know if information was concealed. Maybe the living pilot is mistaken. We know for certain that the shootdown occurred. The aircraft went down in one minute. We know the rescue aircraft appeared six hours later. We know the impressions of the live pilot. We do not know how many of the crew were dead or how many were alive in the water. The main thing--we *must* know about these vessels. I suggest the following: We will use the U.S. information to aid our efforts to find out more information--we'll leave the case open. What is right about the U.S. position? For instance, if I had been the Navy commander, I would have sent boats to investigate. But we didn't know about any radio transmissions of information from fishing boats. I recommend that we treat this as an open question and investigation. We must answer the outstanding questions more concretely. I know, I met Sanderson, and this case is very emotional in the U.S. Well, we're all looking for the truth and we're not going to blame each other. Let's combine our efforts to find the truth."

16. Ambassador Toon said, "As usual, I'm in complete agreement with General Volkogonov. We should leave this question open until both sides do future research. If I may change the subject, I mentioned that we did a lot of work on the issue of Alaska shootdowns. We're continuing our work, but let me hand to you a preliminary statement of results to date. And let me express my personal gratitude for the document on the Vietnamese decision relating to handing over our prisoners. The whole question is highly sensitive and emotional, and we're glad to receive any information that helps. We know this is awkward for you, and we promise to exercise appropriate caution."

17. General Volkogonov responded, "Thank you, Ambassador Toon, for this information on lost Soviet aircraft. It's a blank spot for us and we didn't discuss it in the media. When I was a high- ranking military leader, I got some information on polar and Alaska flights, but I didn't know that some were shot down. We'll study this information very carefully. We will inform you on all information we recover. Now, we still have fifteen minutes left--from one to two is the lunch break, then there are the trips to Podol'sk and to the Air Defense Museum. To conclude, let's consider this Cold War shootdown case as open. As before, by custom, we shall pass all of the information that the U.S. side expects to you, Ambassador Toon. You'll have a chance to ask some questions at Podol'sk."

18. Ambassador Toon added, "One more thing--I've been asked to deliver letters to you from POW/MIA families--and I'd like to ask you if we might photograph the transfer." At this point, Ambassador Toon passed to General Volkogonov a series of letters and documents prepared by POW/MIA family members.

A member of Task Force Russia informally documented the transfer with his camera.

19. General Volkogonov concluded the session by stating that, "The departure for Podolsk is from Ilyinka-12 at 1400 hours. At 1000 tomorrow morning, we will meet for our next session at the Main Archives Department."

20. The session adjourned and the U.S. delegation was escorted back through the Spassky Gate to waiting transportation. After lunch, the delegation split into two groups, one of which toured the Main Soviet Army Archives at Podol'sk, the other of which toured the previously-restricted Air Defense Forces Museum (see current Biweekly Report).

ANNEX B TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA BIWEEKLY REPORT, 17 MAR--16 APR 93

SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT OF 9 APRIL 93 PLENARY SESSION OF THE U.S.- RUSSIAN JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

1. On 9 April 1993, the Joint Commission met in plenary session in a third-floor conference room at Ilyinka-12. Chaired by Ambassador Malcolm Toon, the session began at 1004.

2. Ambassador Toon began by stating, "Yesterday we met in the former chambers of the czar, today I preside over a meeting in the former chambers of the Party Committee of the Central Committee. What is the significance? Are you trying to convert me or put me in my place?" General Volkogonov replied, "We already tried that." Ambassador Toon said, "Well, you failed miserably. But it's good to see you can change. Getting down to business--did you want to talk?"

3. General Volkogonov answered, "To discuss Korea, I need twenty minutes for our report. I want to do the following--dedicated to Korea--again, the war in Korea was in Korea, on third-country territory. Although Soviet forces took part--an air corps, more or less--there are difficult problems working with this in the archives--and there was air defense participation. In the Senate, I heard several times that Soviets took U.S. POWs--pilots. We have searched every source for U.S. pilots or POWs, regarding transfers to the territory of the USSR. Until today we have found no evidentiary documents on the fate of the pilots. We have not found any individuals who saw U.S. pilots on Soviet territory with their own eyes, while the information from the U.S. side seems to be from second- even third-hand sources. One plane, an F-86, was taken to Moscow. The fuselage was in good condition. There is one witness who did not see the U.S. pilot but who knew a friend who saw the pilot--we asked him about this, but he said the witness was dead. We cannot judge this 100% at this time--we need more time to verify it. We are now trying to find all of the men who worked with the construction bureaus who might have seen this pilot. We will try to answer this question by the end of April--is it truth or just a myth? We're using non-traditional methodology to find the facts--criminal investigative experts are involved. We'll use the photos of pilots from U.S. sources and from our own channels. We'll send the photos to the Interior Ministry for them to compare the photos with their files. Perhaps the Stalin regime tried to conceal U.S. pilots under other names. We could use fingerprint data and so forth. There's a lot of time-consuming work to be done, but we'll work hard at we should have something in three months--but there are no results yet. The actual available material is serious and can, I hope, help us. You know, however, that our archives are not computerized and all of our work is by hand. Still, our work in the military archives has surfaced some *important* documents. There are six files that bear on the fates of 100 or more U.S. pilots. These fall under "operational actions." There are six files on shootdown of 140 U.S. planes by Soviet air defense forces in Korea. We have tried to do a map displaying the locations of the shootdowns, which occurred from 12 October 1951 to 20 May 1952. From these 140 shootdowns, we know 130 locations with an exactness down to 1 to 10 meters. The information describes the fate of every crew. In the archives, we often have the manufacturer's number of the aircraft and other characteristics. We will now give you documents that contain not only time and place, but characteristics and descriptions of what happened to the aircrews and pilots. There are special papers for every case. They are signed by the commander of the Air Defense unit--with maps. These were done with the cooperation of the Pyongyang government. Now U.S. researchers can find out where they're buried--especially your MIAs. Otherwise, we are currently studying documents we are not yet ready to give you--they are in a number of different archives--such as

the records of the 64th Air Fighter Corps. This may help us establish the fate of dozens or even hundreds of U.S. pilots. The archives tell the number of shootdowns, the number of prisoners--we have concretized the information on the fates of U.S. pilots. Of course, it was more than forty years ago--and we are not responsible--but it's a humanitarian problem for us. You must go to the Pyongyang government for further information. As you were told yesterday by Professor Orlov, there is still more information on U.S. POWs in the military archives. He will say a few words and we will declassify this information--and we will continue our work. We think the question cannot be closed, since the problem remains of the rumors of U.S. pilots on the territory of the USSR. The Russian side thinks that, if it is a myth, we will prove it. If it is a secret, we must find the evidence. Perhaps in April-May we will have answers to all of these questions. We must talk to the following individuals who are present with us today, Konstantin Raspin, Ivan Malyshev, Viktor Shuster, Alexei Orlov, Gavril Korotkov and Mikhail Fisenko. We can talk to them now or later. Thank you.

4. Ambassador Toon replied: "Thank you. Clearly, under your leadership, you have worked hard on this very taxing question. We are very happy to receive these documents and look forward to receiving further documents. Is this showing where U.S. aircraft were shot down by Soviet ADA, did survivors wind up in Soviet hands? How did you handle it? You said only 120 were shot down by Soviet ADA. It's a very important question."

5. General Volkogonov said, "The air defense division stayed only for seven months. Many pilots did not survive, but died in the crashes. Sometimes there were bodies, in some cases we know of graves. There were some cases of parachutes--but we don't know anything about their fates. The air defense men only tried to shoot them down--it was up to the Korean side to capture them. The Korean side can answer on that. It does say that, in twenty- four hours or longer, Soviet air defense personnel would come to the wrecks to take parts as evidence of the shootdown. This happened many times. For example--2 May 1952, an F-86 was shot down. The pilot died in the wreck of the aircraft. Also--22 May, body parts were found. Another time a pilot was burned to death, here one was buried...Sometimes they saw parachutes, but we have no further information. Maybe there were prisoners..."

6. Ambassador Toon said, "We're glad you're working so hard, and we look forward to further information. Let me assure you of the great interest back home--not only from families, but from the highest levels of government. I had a long talk with Secretary Christopher and he indicated to me that this issue is very important. My colleague, Congressman Johnson, flew in Korea and Vietnam--I call on him." Congressman Johnson said, "I would, with respect, ask if the same recovery procedure occurred with aircraft shot down across the border in China as is Korea-- because your units were in China."

7. General Volkogonov responded, "I must say we know only what is written in these documents. We don't know names, for instance, but we have aircraft numbers and thus you can track down the names. I think you can tell the families when and where their loved ones died." Congressman Johnson then asked, "Is this information confined to Korea, or does it include China, also?" General Volkogonov answered, "We can't exclude the existence of such information, but we don't have it now. There are many more documents from the air defense and air units on Chinese territory. There are many documents, and we need more time for our search." Congressman Johnson thanked General Volkogonov for his consideration.

8. Ambassador Toon said, "General, as you know, we have conducted several interviews jointly over the last several months. Also, we had discussions with former U.S. officials and [worked in the] archives. We've put together a video tape with the results of these searches. Before we show it to you, I assure you that we have not yet concluded that you were involved, but we want to share information with you that leads our thinking. We don't know what happened, but this information raises suspicions in a lot of minds. Let me turn it over to MG Loeffke."

9. MG Loeffke said, "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. My introduction consists of three points. First, we looked carefully at all documents provided over the last ten months and produced a book Ambassador Toon will now give to General Volkogonov." Ambassador Toon interjected, "Together with an explanatory letter." MG Loeffke continued, "The letter is 12 pages long, in Russian. At the tabs are each

of the Russian documents you provided to us.

There are questions that arise from each document. Second, the TV tape Ambassador Toon just mentioned--last time we gave you a written document on the transport issue. This is our attempt to visually depict field interviews--not archival material--but what we've found. To facilitate the presentation, here is the document in Russian and English--here is a transcript. As these are passed out, please look at page eight. On page 8 there's an interview with a Lithuanian parliamentarian. We want to highlight that he mentions a U.S. service member apprehended in Korea--but not during the Korean War. The parliamentarian alleges that he was in a camp with an American apprehended in Korea at the end of WWII. The other item I want to highlight is that Colonel Korotkov, who is here today, is on the tape. This was not an interview we conducted, but we thought he should see it. It'll be on television soon in the United States. It was given to us by someone who conducted the interview." Ambassador Toon interjected, "Let me clarify the point on the Lithuanian--the implication on the tape is that this was a U.S. POW from the Korean War. Earlier this week, we talked with the Lithuanian parliamentarian, and it appeared our impression was wrong..." MG Loeffke resumed, "We feel the questions raised by the video will help us bridge the information gap.

10 . At this point, the U. S . side played the videotape *Korean War POW Transfers To The Soviet Union: Eyewitnesses.* [A transcript of the videotape is included with this Biweekly Report as Annex C.] The visible range of reactions from the Russian side ranged from rapt attention through disgust at some of the Russian testimony to some who simply scanned the script then waited for the tape to end. The strongest reaction--dead silence--occurred when Mr. Xu testified that he had been an eyewitness to prisoner executions and to the transfer of three POWs to the Russians.

11. Upon the conclusion of the video, Ambassador Toon said, "I'd like to make it clear that our only reason for showing you this videotape is to make available to you all of the information which leads some of our people to believe the transfers took place. We have no way to know if the information provided by these people is valid, but we thought it was important. If both sides are to find the truth, then each side should be entitled to information available to the other in order to arrive at a considered judgement. Are there any questions?"

12. General Volkogonov said, "I think Colonels Korotkov and Orlov and the other veterans might briefly clarify this matter--and General Krayushkin." Ambassador Toon said, "I think that would be useful." Colonel Korotkov stood up and said, "I want to say once more I never personally saw U.S. POWs transferred to the USSR--my role in the Far East didn't allow me to have close and personal contact with U.S. POWs. I can add that there were lots of rumors in Khabarovsk and other Far Eastern areas to the effect that POWs from various nations were transferred from the Korean front to the USSR. These were the rumors. There was such secrecy that we wouldn't know for sure. The right course is the document search. I think we can find something here. There's a Russian proverb, 'Where there's smoke, there's fire.' If there were rumors, then there could have been transfers." [Note: immediately after this day's session, upon saying farewell in the street, Colonel Korotkov told General Loeffke that the U.S. side needed to keep pushing because it's "very close" to the truth.]

13. General Krayushkin stated, "As agreed at our last meeting, we searched on the Korean War period. My colleagues in the Central Security Department Archives looked through a huge mass of information from this period, 1950 to 1953. We especially paid attention to the files of military counterintelligence, including the special units of the Far Easter Border Guards and the counterintelligence departments of the air defense units and fleet commander's information and encoded telegrams sent from the Far East--material from the KGB representation responsible for the relationship with the Chinese government, from the MGR unit in Korea. In this complex of material we found nothing to show the result of transfers--no transit of holding of POWs or evidence from counterintelligence showing the presence of POWs on Russian territory. I'd like to add something to General Volkogonov's report, to stress two facts. First, on 6 November 1951, when Soviet aviation near Cape [unintelligible] in the Budyonny area of Primorskiy Krai shot down a U.S. intelligence plane "Neptune"--Soviet planes followed and it opened fire. Soviet planes shot it down and destroyed it. Why raise this? Because in the documents you gave us yesterday it says that the fate of the crew is unknown--but the reports of the local krai security forces told Minister

Ignatiev that the U.S. plane burned and crashed into the sea with its crew. On the next day, the Border Guards planes flew a search mission to confirm that no pilots were alive in the water--they found nothing. For a week, they searched for evidence, but found nothing. However, on 6 November 1951, in a report to the Party Secretary for the Far East, the chief of the MGB department in the naval fleet claimed that Chinese security forces had captured a U.S. pilot." Krayushkin then began to read, "4 September, 1952, at 5 o'clock, Chinese security forces captured a U.S. pilot who parachuted from an aircraft. The pilot flew an F-86. He was from the 51st Air Division of the 5th Air Force. He was accompanying bombers in combat action near Yan Dun Peninsula, when his aircraft was damaged and he lost orientation in the clouds. With fuel running out, he bailed out." Krayushkin then said, "We gave these documents to General Volkogonov and these will be given to the U.S. side. I want to underline once more that, in the archives of the Security Department, we have not found one single document or aid to allow us to say anything positive on the U.S. pilot issue from the Korean War. Our work is thorough, and our personnel are well-trained and dedicated. Despite some of their political ideas, they try to carry out the orders from the new Russian President and General Volkogonov, and, as chief of the department, I've made sure of that."

14. Colonel Orlov stood up and said, "Looking through this book, there is nothing from the end of 1950 to the end of 1951. This is important because in this period until November 1951 many B-29s were shot down--and they had large crews. From November 1951, the B-29s began night flights and losses decreased. Therefore, I feel we should continue the search in this concrete period. I've found no archival evidence--yet, in the Central Military Archives, there is information of POWs now being declassified. For example, there is information of 2LT Michael DeMoyne, On Lt. Smith, Lt. Harvey--that's what we just found and we're looking for more. However, there's a classification-problem. I ask the authorities to accelerate the declassification process. My second question--yesterday, you gave us this book . Let me draw your attention to the incident involving the C-130 on 2 September 1958. Here it says that Assistant Secretary of State Murphy met with Soviet Ambassador Menshikov and that the U.S. side believed the aircraft was lured over Soviet territory by the use of beacons. It also stated in U.S. News and World Report from the 'Sam Klaus' files on the incident with the C-118 on 27 June 1958 that that plane was lured to Soviet territory. I was serving in the air defense headquarters in Baku, in the area, back then, and intelligence on U.S. aircraft was my main duty. I can confirm that this 'luring' was never attempted by us. Moreover, we greatly feared these violations because U.S. aircraft sometimes left our airspace without punishment and the commanders of the air defense forces got in great trouble and were severely punished. There were frequent cases like this in the Caucasus. Let me explain. In flying the corridor along the Soviet-Turkish border to Iran, the aircrews had two orientation points, Lake Van in Turkey and a lake in Iran. But there was also Lake Sevan on Soviet territory, and sometimes pilots would fly for it instead of for Lake Van. But the Soviet side *never* tried to lure U.S. aircraft on purpose.

15. Ambassador Toon said, "It's time for a break. But first, I hope you will speed up declassification so we can gain access to these very important documents. Second, a personal observation: my first tour in the USSR was during the Korean War, and there was no question in my mind that we were very close to being complete enemies. Our daily press expressed only abomination for each other. I had the gut feeling then that the authorities in Moscow would do everything possible to get their hands on U.S. POWs. If I had been running the Soviet Union back then, I would have done it. Anyway, it's important to combine our efforts to resolve this. Rightly or wrongly, the feeling in my country is that you were involved. With your help and that of your colleagues, we can resolve this soon.

16. General Volkogonov responded, "I want to say that this information could be right or wrong, but we must examine it. We are very much interested in finding the truth, thus we ask you to leave this video with us. Second, the President presented a written order that any information concerning U.S. pilot POWs was to be declassified immediately . I *demand* that Colonel Mukhin report to me on Monday--there is a written order from the President and I ask my colleagues to comply."

17. A coffee break followed. The session resumed at 1200 hours. Ambassador Toon said, "I want to introduce Congressman Johnson from the state of Texas." Congressman Johnson said, "Thank you for this open meeting. It's important to talk frankly, and I hope we continue in this vein in the future. I would ask that, perhaps, even though it's a delicate area, that we could get into the issue of the involvement of China in Korea--or even in Vietnam. We should continue to direct our efforts to solve problems on both

sides. I thank you again. I know that, as military people, we have like interests, and I look forward to reading your book. Thank you."

18. Ambassador Toon next recognized Mr. Denis Clift. Mr. Clift said, "Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. This is my fourth session and I've been struck by the positive give and take in this session. The exchange of significant new documents opens new avenues of inquiry, and there were important commitments by each organization we visited yesterday afternoon to help. I was also struck by the positive tone in each of the Baltic states we visited this week. As mentioned, there are important gaps in the data we still require, but it is my hope, sir, General Volkogonov, that there will be a fresh commitment to filling those gaps. Thank you."

19. Ambassador Toon then recognized Mr. Ed Ross of the Department of Defense. Mr. Ross said, "First, there is one piece of unfinished business, General Volkogonov. We requested the source of the lists of 71 and 59 names and of which you stated you have interrogation reports given to you by the North Koreans. You later provided us with 40 of those reports. After careful translation, analysis and comparison, we determined the following: 4 of the names on the 59 list and 7 on the 71 list correspond to missing American service members who were not repatriated. Of the 40 interrogation reports, none relate to any of those 11 men. We request that you check your files for names and provide us with any information you find. Let me stress this information is being provided to you separately now--I'll pass it through Ambassador Toon--because we handle these interrogation reports as very sensitive documents. We handle POW interrogation reports as 'close hold.' Now, with Ambassador Toon's permission, I'll make a brief comment on the work of the Commission. I concur with the earlier remarks. I, too, have been with the Commission almost since the beginning, and I'm very encouraged by the work accomplished. As evident from today's meeting, many unanswered questions remain and there is information to be declassified. I'm confident that we'll continue to work and move forward. But we must determine what the means are to bring individual questions to closure. Preliminary analysis suggests that some of the Cold War cases may be able to be closed. The question of U.S. POW Korean War transfers is a much more difficult problem. In conclusion, I want to stress that whatever criteria we use must stand very close scrutiny from the families, the American people and the U.S. Congress. It's my very great pleasure and honor to be associated with the Commission, and I hope the future is also productive. Thank you very much."

20. LTC Osipov stood up and stated, "About the names not mentioned in the interrogation papers--they are from all sources in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Security...we checked for the name of every POW, and, as a result, the list contains every name, independent of whether or not detailed information was available. There was foreign information and even radio sources. For example, Herbert Low, Lieutenant, we took his name from the address he gave on Pyongyang radio. In the Main Political Directorate, Mr. Korotkov prepared their documents and they used all kinds of information from the Chinese and Korean services and local press analysis. All of these names were included on our list. I assure you that, if a name appeared without further explanation, we didn't know anything else."

21. Ambassador Toon recognized MG Loeffke of Task Force Russia. MG Loeffke said, "I have four points. First, during the break one of our Russian colleagues asked me: do I believe that Korean War POW transfers took place? Ambassador Toon asked us all along to keep an open mind and not have personal opinions. Second, through the television videotape we showed you what we receive on an almost daily basis in the U.S. Third, the Chinese interview was provided to us by a Congressman of the United States Congress. We thought it important for you to see the kind of information our representatives ask us to look at. Fourth, for many of us here this is our last mission with Task Force Russia. I express my gratitude for the kindness extended to me and my team on so many occasions. I served here as Army attache under Ambassador Toon and I must tell you I am personally happy to see the kind of relationship we have today, and I hope it gets even better. Thank you for letting me serve, Mr. Ambassador."

22. Ambassador Toon explained that MG Loeffke was leaving for personal reasons and stated that he was sorry to see him go and was certain that all of his colleagues would share his feelings. General Volkogonov said to MG Loeffke, "You are an excellent member of the Commission and an excellent man."

23. MG Kalinin of the Ministry of Internal Affairs took the floor and said, "The documents we have received from you are of great interest. As a measure of our interest, let me say that, concerning this matter of trainloads of prisoners, well, the MVD has worked in Khabarovsk and in Primorskiy Krai researching these matters, and we never found such facts. Today, at 1500 hours, colleagues will appear who worked at filtration points during the Korean War. You can ask them. They are from the Korean War and Vietnam War periods. They have vast information on this time, but no information on U.S. POWs. On Sunday, a group of personnel will travel to the Far East for a two-week period to do all the necessary research on the transfer of prisoners to the USSR. To shorten the work, we must give you documents on Group E-2. One man gave us facts in which we are interested. There is important information from partisans and spies. There is also information on Soviet defectors--we need this from your files. From our side, we will try to do everything to seek out the facts."

24. Ambassador Toon thanked MG Kalinin, commenting that on-site work in the Far East was a good thing. Ambassador Toon then recognized Colonel Mukhin, who stated, "I represent the Ministry of Defense. Many members of the Committee work closely with the military archives, and we have an especially close relationship with General Loeffke and Colonel Herrington that has now given us very good results. And I think you have gotten very good results from us. Further work on Korea will involve the aviation activities. Today, you'll get air defense materials, and we have the same on aviation, but the amount is less, since pilots work up in the air and didn't confirm results. Still, it's interesting. And, despite what Professor Orlov said, I declare all of the air corps documents to be declassified. Representatives of Task Force Russia looked at this at our archives yesterday and they can confirm it. Now, concerning Cold War work. We must do more work with naval aviation records from the Central Navy Archives in Leningrad. U.S. representatives were there and we showed a few of the documents, but we must dig deeper. And I congratulate all members--especially the U.S. military members--for understanding the difficulty of our work."

25. Colonel (Professor) Orlov said, "I didn't speak about the 64th Air Corps, I said the *interrogation* reports of POWs for an important period are missing--which involve a huge number of B-29s shot down." Ambassador Toon responded, "On Colonel Mukhin's remarks, we are very appreciative of the access we've gained to Podolsk. This is the very useful information we need to have, and we understand that there's useful information in St. Petersburg--but can we be sure of gaining the same access in St. Petersburg as in Podolsk?" Colonel Mukhin responded, "We will fulfill the President's order."

26. Colonel Mazurov of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service took the floor and said, "Esteemed colleagues, I begin with a few words of regret about information in the American mass media. On 24 June 1992, the *Washington Times* quoted Pentagon sources, citing a secret report supposedly confirming that the Foreign Intelligence Service and the GRU don't have full enthusiasm for this work and that the Russian intelligence agencies don't want to solve this problem. Then there was a second article on 30 December 1992--the author was Bill Gertz--saying that a secret telegram that the Department of State received from the Moscow embassy on 10 December says that the Russian side sabotages the work of the U.S. Commission to find out the fate of U.S. POWs. In his words, the telegram says that, after months of work about which this telegram is a final report, the telegram underlines the main role of refusing access to sources and archives holding information on POWs by the SVR [Note: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, successor to the KGB] and the GRU. These organizations [Gertz says] even refused to allow meetings with former colleagues and witnesses to the events. You have the original article to read. Now my command would like an explanation, from me, so I can say a few words of explanation. I judge the first article as a political show for the Presidential election. But the second article is an attempt to exert pressure--we wouldn't have paid any attention, but the author mentioned the Pentagon, the Department of State and the American side of the Commission. An evaluation of our sources began on the POW list in spite of these provocations and we gave it to you--with some delay--and I want to inform you about some immediate results. Now we have worked over 75% of the material, with 25% remaining. As a result, we can surface the names of Bergman, Lewis, born in 1926, a master sergeant and a radio man; of Han, Joseph, born in 1919, a captain and engineer for radio location; and Kunega, Dedzin, born in 1925, a pilot. All were members of the crew of a B-29 shot down on 10 May 1951. All of these crewmen were POWs. We do not know anything more about them. Also, Leonard B. Button, born on 16 January 1923, in Iowa--he was an adviser on technical matters in the Headquarters, Far East, on the island of Hokkaido

[as heard]. He was captured on 12 May 1953 in the area of Dong Chen by the 5th Army of North Korea's counterintelligence organs. He was captured during the period when he went to meet his two agents who were coming back from a mission. The two agents and he were captured. We have no information on the names, ages or nationalities of the agents. Their fate is unknown. This information was given to us by the Koreans in the period between 1951 and 1953. Besides, we compared the list you gave us of about 1,500 men from the Korean War with our own list of 537 men. 28 men mentioned in the new list, well, in this manner we found information on a total of 571. 25% of the work remains to be done. Now, on the transcription of U.S. names--we ask you to write them both in English and Russian. Overall, we may say there has been productive work by the intelligence services on the Korean War list. I recognize and thank all of the members of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador Toon, for your personal respect. Now, on the notebook I lost on the way to Vladivostok--it contained no secrets. On my flight back, I found I didn't have it. I reported this to my command, that I had lost it. But it was returned to me by New Year's. Thanks to all of you who participated in this operation."

27. Ambassador Toon said, "Let me make a comment." Mazurov said, "Now you see the level of cooperation between our intelligence--imagine this during the Cold War period." Ambassador Toon said, "We have paid attention--in the old days, you would never have gotten that notebook back. On the press articles, we have a commitment to a free press. If I tried to explain our position as depicted by the press, it would take another week. Don't be too concerned." Mazurov said, "I agree regarding the mass media. I published an article in *Trud, I* didn't cite Gertz, just members sitting here..." Ambassador Toon said, "I'd like the full text of that article. Our press is free..." Mazurov said, "We need trust." Ambassador Toon said, "I agree, and let me stress that our mission is completely humanitarian. Please inform Mr. Primakov that we rely on his cooperation. We need the information he can give us to resolve the POW issue--and that's our sole purpose." Mazurov said, "We will give you all we find."

28. General Volkogonov said, "Shall we say a few words about our future work, our plans?" Ambassador Toon said, "You suggested meeting in September. We can have work group sessions from time to time without the full Commission. On the Sakhalin trip, we agree it should occur in late May and be low key. But we should pursue it. We look forward to studying the documents you gave us, and we'll be in touch. As I said previously, it was a very useful exercise in Podolsk and we hope to expand it to St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, it's important that you and I stay in touch. We'll settle the September date through the Commission."

29. General Volkogonov said, "A few words...I want to express full satisfaction with the work of the Commission. Our relations and results have been good, in spite of all the drawbacks, and they will be productive. Yeltsin said that in Vancouver he talked with President Clinton about POWs and the Russian President will produce a special report in May. This will be prepared by me to inform Clinton. It testifies to the Russian leadership's attention to humanitarian issues. The Russian President is sincere in developing good relations with the U.S. side. Secondly, I agree to meet in September. Our working channels can determine the date. And, in the meantime, in mid-May we'll go to the Far East. We'll discuss that. If there are no results, it will not have to be publicized. Thirdly, by the end of the month we will finish our work on the Korean War shootdown documents, not only from air defense forces, but from aviation, too. To examine all of the contents of the videotape will take us much more time. We also need more time to check on Vietnam War period information. And we continue our Cold War shootdown research. All details from the Vladivostok shootdown will be re-examined. We will consult experts and order them to examine the situation regarding the American plane near Yerevan. We won't be taking any parliamentary holidays, so we'll continue our work. We hope to have positive results by September. I personally promise to do all that is possible."

30. Ambassador Toon said, "I agree to do the same. This has been a very productive meeting. Thanks for being an excellent host. I'm glad to hear about the Vancouver discussion with our President." General Volkogonov said, "Now we can go to the journalists...well, after a 5 to 7 minute break, then to the press conference. There's a little problem with press access... At this point the meeting broke up.

JOINT TASK FORCE RUSSIA BIWEEKLY REPORT, 17 MAR--16 APR 93

SUBJECT: SCRIPT FOR VIDEOTAPE PRESENTED TO THE RUSSIAN SIDE OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS ON 9 APRIL 1993.

TITLE: KOREAN WAR POW TRANSFERS TO THE SOVIET UNION, EYEWITNESSES

Eight thousand, two hundred U.S. service members were listed as Missing In Action following the Korean War. Of those soldiers, Marines and airmen who did not return home, some were known to have been prisoners. Their names and photographs either appeared in the Communist press, or they were listed on early Red Cross reports as Prisoners of War. The United States realizes that we will never know with certainty the fate of every unaccounted for service member. We realize that some POWs died of disease, of wounds or of the hardships of captivity, in camps on or near the Korean Peninsula, and that the majority of our POWs, certainly those who were repatriated, did not encounter Soviet personnel.

We also understand that the mood of the times, the height of the Cold War, made it a reasonable course of action from Moscow's point of view to exploit the opportunity to gain control of select American POWs. Our research has led us to the conclusion that--in the words of one Russian participant--"tens, if not hundreds" of our POWs were transferred to the former Soviet Union. We need the assistance of our colleagues on the Russian delegation to the Joint Commission in order to determine their fates. If some have survived, we wish to offer them repatriation. If they are all deceased, we wish to repatriate their remains. We do not wish to assign blame--we want to put this issue behind us. But we cannot do so as long as the families of these lost service members have unanswered questions. In December, we gave you a document entitled, "Summary of Information," which provided the basis for our belief that U.S. Korean War POWs were transferred to the territory of the former USSR. Now we would like to briefly show you eyewitness testimony that reinforces this conclusion.

As we have learned through documents provided by the Russian side of the Commission, Stalin believed that the possession of POWs could provide useful bargaining leverage. Stalin's communications with Chou en-Lai reflect this. Stalin counseled the Chinese to hold up to 20% of U.S. and allied POWs when the bulk of the prisoners were repatriated.

In November, 1992, Colonel-General Volkogonov testified before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs.

((General Volkogonov's Testimony))

Volkogonov: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]* (trans - But I believe it's possible because in Korea agents of our special services did interrogate American pilots, so by logic, it is possible that the same was done in Vietnam.)

Volkogonov: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]*

(trans - There is irrefutable evidence that this was done in Korea, we have documents of the interrogations.)

((end testimony))

The lessons we in the Commission have learned from our efforts concerning Korea are that, if we persevere in our joint cooperation, and if we supplement our archival search with interviews of living participants, we can uncover additional information about what happened in Korea--even when the trail is forty years old.

Here are a few randomly selected photographs of unaccounted for U.S. service members from the Korean War -- men who could have been candidates for transport to the former Soviet Union as part of such a

program. Most would have been aviators -- men who possessed information on our strategic bombers, fighter aircraft, and related technologies. What became of these missing Americans? Retired Colonel G.I. Korotkov of the GRU-Soviet Military Intelligence- has provided additional information. During a series of interviews in Moscow and again during the December meeting of the Joint Commission, Colonel Korotkov described his experiences during the Korean War. A junior officer and English speaker, he was posted to Khabarovsk, a Soviet city near the theater of war. Colonel Korotkov described how, on two occasions, he travelled to the Korean-Soviet border area, to an ill-defined location that could have been in Korea or in the Soviet Union where he and his colleagues personally interrogated U.S. POWs. Colonel Korotkov met and interrogated these Americans while wearing his Soviet officer's uniform. This happened in a war zone where Red Army officers were only permitted to wear their Soviet uniforms when on Soviet soil. Officers who entered China or North Korea wore Chinese or Korean uniforms. Colonel Korotkov recalls that the U.S. POWs were escorted to him by a female border guards officer also wearing a Soviet uniform. However, no repatriated POWs recall such incidents. Recently, a Western journalist videotaped an interview with Colonel Korotkov, in which he explicitly states that U.S. POWs were moved through the Soviet city of Khabarovsk:

((Korotkov's Testimony))

Korotkov: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]*

(trans - But he knows for sure that they were taken through Khabarovsk, American POWs.)

Korotkov: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]*

(trans - But they did not stop there, they were not interrogated there.)

Korotkov: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]*

(trans - There was no need because they could easily go to the border areas.)

((end testimony))

But not all of the direct evidence on POW transfers to the Soviet Union comes from Russian sources. The People's Republic of China also was instrumental in the exploitation of U.S. POWs. Russian sources admit close cooperation with the Chinese. Now let's listen to a Chinese veteran, Mr. Ping Hwa Xu, a former officer in the Chinese People's Volunteers, who personally witnessed the handover of U.S. POWs to Soviets.

((Mr. XU's Testimony))

Xu: As a citizen I will honestly and truthfully describe events that I've personally witnessed, heard, or experienced. I do not say anything that I don't have personal knowledge, experience, or eyewitness account of. If I don't know - I don't know.

I have personally witnessed and experienced the following two events. First I have personally witnessed the POW management - sick/wounded POW management. I have personally witnessed the killings (of these sick/wounded POW) around me. I have no problem to take the stand as material witness. Secondly, I have personally witnessed the transferring of three pilots to the Soviets.

Xu: After arriving at Changgedong - this is the second time I have seen the Soviets. They (Soviets) were

wearing the ?PLA? military uniform.

[How many?]

About 10 Soviets. While some don't look like caucasians (big nose Russians), they all speak Russian.

Xu: Our headquarters have many translators; they (Soviets) were not interested in anything but the three pilots.

[What procedures did you follow?]

After we picked them up (Soviets), two translators (Chinese) escorted them to (inaudible). We all followed (Soviets and translators). They were speaking Russian while pointing at the three pilots. We took the jeep parked outside of the prison and went back for a rest. Those pilots were taken away in a jeep in less than an hour - very quickly. There were 4 or 5 jeeps and a medium size vehicle (3/4 ton truck) parked outside.

Xu: Our division chief told me that the Soviets specifically requested that we turn over the pilots to them. He (division chief) told me on that day that the pilots were going to be transferred to the Soviet Union.

Xu: I believe it was our division policy to turn over all (American) pilots to the Soviets. The (one) example I've provided exemplified the policy.

((end testimony))

In Russia and other states emerging from the former Soviet Union, a number of aging veterans of the GULag have come forward to report contacts with U.S. service members within the camp system. Mr. Nikolai Kazerski was imprisoned in the Zimka labor camp from 1950 until 1955. Mr. Kazerski met and spoke with an American inmate, a military aviator from the Korean War. Kazerski provided a detailed description of the American, which enabled us to correlate his sighting with this man - First Lieutenant Ara Mooradian of Fresno, California. Mr. Kazerski examined a line-up of sixteen photographs of missing US aviators. Despite the passage of more than forty years, Kazerski selected four of the sixteen whom he believed resembled the prisoner he had met. One of the four was Lt. Mooradian.

Lithuanian Parliamentarian Balys Gajaukas spent decades in the GULag. He too, reports encountering an American from Korea in the camp system in the Balkash area in the 1950's.

((Gajaukas's testimony))

Gajauskas: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]*

(trans - There was one American there.)

Gajauskas: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]*

(trans - He told me that he had been brought from the Far East, a camp, where there was only foreigners and was restricted; they didn't know anything, in general they had no contacts at all.)

Gajauskas: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]*

(trans - He was of medium height, thin and slender. Well, you know, in the camp, everyone was thin [laughs]. He was, by nature, very ... well, he could approach anyone. He was very sociable, as we say in the USSR.)

Gaujauskas: *[[LIBRARY OF CONGRESS EDITORIAL NOTE: At this point in the original document, which is available on microfilm, the Russian (Cyrillic) text appears; the translation provided by Task Force Russia follows]]*

(trans - [city...from what country?] That I don't know. Two of them stopped by, those Soviets. I remember this now because how did he get them here from this part? Well, where they arrested them, because there were also Koreans from the northern part, there were 50 Koreans in our camp.

((end testimony))

Retired LTC Phillip Corso of the U.S. Army worked in Korea as the officer responsible for monitoring the status of U.S. POWs, after which he worked on the National Security Council. LTC Corso developed intelligence information that proved to him that U.S. POWs were transferred to Soviet territory -- which he, in turn, reported to President Eisenhower.

((Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Corso's testimony))

I was chief of what we called the Special Projects Branch of a Far East Command, G-2 Intelligence Division and that job entailed, in addition to many other duties, like targeting, and so forth, it entailed that I watch, that I keep track of all prisoner of war camps, our prisoners, how they were being treated and where they were, and who was in charge and how they were being interrogated and so forth. That was actually my duty and I was head of the division at MacArthur's headquarters. I had definite information of train loads, two certain, possibly three. Each train held 450 prisoners. These prisoners were taken from North Korea through Mukden, Manchuria to Manchouly. Manchouly is on the border of Manchuria and Russia where the gauge changes. That meant that prisoners would be transferred from one train to the other over a landing and that was the point where most of the prisoners were seen and recognized as Americans and they were heading to the Soviet Union over the border in a Soviet train whose gauge was different than the Chinese train. I secured this information from, I'd say, hundreds of prisoner of war reports, from Chinese and North Koreans, who actually saw these prisoners being transported and talked to some of them. Also, we had guerrillas and agents in the area who saw these prisoners being transported and later I talked to a few high level Soviet defectors who confirmed it - that this transfer was going on.

The Soviets had perfected the system and it was very sophisticated in the way that they operated. Also, we had information that once the information was taken from them, and they were used, how the Soviets saw fit to use them, they were eliminated, and they would never come back. Which I think happened - they never came back.

So, mostly, my information on numbers and the transfer of prisoners was not taken from defectors. I didn't need that from defectors - we had that information, but the operation within the Soviet Union, and the way they treated and what they did with these prisoners - that was where we were lacking in a lot of our information. And that I tried to get - and I got it - from defectors.

((end testimony))

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission realizes the problems faced by our Russian counterparts in researching this issue. Such a POW transfer operation clearly would have been very closely controlled and highly secret. We know that when many of our Russian counterparts say to us that no such transfer ever took place, they are being honest and sincere--since they personally have no knowledge of the transfers, and these records, if they have not been destroyed, remain a closely guarded secret. We further realize that those few who should have knowledge of the POW transfer to the former USSR may be reluctant to speak out for a variety of reasons--not the least of which might be state security.

Certainly, we understand that these operations were never meant to see the light of day. But no one could foresee that our countries would develop the friendly relations we witness today. We respectfully request your cooperation as we move on with our attempts to identify those POWs who may have been transferred and to determine what became of them. It is our hope that this film will advance the work of the Commission by providing a better understanding of why our people believe that these prisoner transfers took place.

ANNEX D TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA BIWEEKLY REPORT, 17 MAR--16 APR 93

SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT OF LIMITED-PARTICIPATION AFTERNOON INTERVIEW SESSION WITH RUSSIAN VETERANS ON 9 APRIL 93.

1. This session occurred after the joint press conference and lunch on 9 April 93. This was a working-level session to enable U.S. delegates and their assistants to question Russian officers and officials who had service contemporary to the Korean War, with some overlap to the Vietnam era. Mr. Dennis Clift of DIA was the senior U.S. representative; the Russian side was headed by LTC Osipov. The session was conducted almost entirely in Russian, with informal simultaneous translations for those Americans who did not speak Russian.

2. Mr. Clift opened the session by saying, "On behalf of Ambassador Toon, I want to thank each of you for being with us--I have no speech, since we want to hear from you." MG Kalinin of the MVD then introduced the first three panelists, former internal and security services officers Raskin, Malyshev and Shuster. Kalinin opened with Mr. Raskin, who, he stated, had served with the NKVD since 1937 and is currently a pensioner. Raskin worked in a series of camps in the Far East from 1937 onward. Raskin worked in the "BAMLag" on the Amur River, constructing the Amur to Baikal railway; later, he worked in the Primorskiy and Khabarovskiy Krais, then in agricultural production camps. Raskin stated that his prisoners were mostly common criminals, "murderers, hooligans and thieves." He said, "We had few political prisoners with us. Honestly, I just had working prisoners in the special camp territories for that sort of thing. The main thing my colleagues and I had to do was to preserve internal order. By the way, if they worked hard and fulfilled the norms, they could get a reduced sentence. For example, a ten year sentence could be worked down to three-and- one-half years."

3. Colonel Osipov said, "Please talk about the camps in the 50's and 60's." MG Kalinin excuses himself, due to another commitment. Osipov continued, "During the Korean or Vietnam Wars, did you hear anything about U.S. POWs?" MG Loeffke said, "Did you hear anything at all?" Osipov said, "Please just talk about that."

4. Raskin responded, "In the 50's period, in '53 I worked in the Krasnoyarsk special lager. We were involved in transferring material assistance to Korea during this time, but we heard nothing about POWs. The camps were arranged in stages and this facilitated our work. Later, I worked in the main directorate for the lager system. In '53, they transferred me to the central administration But, even there, I didn't hear anything." LTC Osipov asked, "When you worked in the central administration, what kind of documents did you handle?" Raskin said, "In Krasnoyarsk, we concentrated on crime data, on the health of the prisoners and that sort of thing, and on administrative data. There were all kinds of forms on the administration of the lives of the prisoners. In our system, which was an independent system...well, you see, we knew only the camps in which we served--and there were no foreigners. Personally, I did take business trips to other camps two or three times. But I never heard talk of POWs."

5. MG Loeffke said, "Thanks, we need to talk to the others." Osipov said, "They researched in the 1955 files in the special department for criminal research--it was a scientific organization--but it turned out to have nothing to do with POWs. Let me introduce Mr. Malyshev, who worked in the MVD."

6. Malyshev said, "I did operational work with foreign POWs. At the close of WWII, we were sending them through Poland, from Germany, Austria. Later I worked in the special crimes department, from '53 to '84. All information of foreign prisoners in the Soviet Union passed through my hands. But there were *no instances* of POWs from Vietnam. I worked with Germans, Austrians, all according to the law--and,

by law, all documents on foreigners and POW's came through my office. Now, speaking of the Germans and the Austrians, there were a lot of prisoners up until '53, when the amnesties began. But the crimes were all documented. In thirty years, I never met one American who came through us."

7.- LTC Osipov asked, "What about in Tambov? Wasn't there a group of Americans in Tambov?" Malyshev answered, "That must have been before my time. Maybe it was prior to '54. In any case, I knew nothing at all about that." MG Loeffke asked, "Could there have been secret camps?" Malyshev answered, "Not at all." Osipov asked, "And the Vladimir special prison?" Malyshev answered, "Well, I have no knowledge about that." MG Loeffke asked, "Weren't there special camps?" Malyshev responded, "In Mordovia, there the MVD had camps for foreigners." Colonel Herrington asked, "What about KGB special camps?" Malyshev said, "No, they didn't exist. Up until '53, I was MGB, then I went MVD." Colonel Herrington said, "But eyewitness reports say there were Americans." Malyshev said, "In '53?" Herrington continued, "On the other hand, as we've looked for the truth since last summer, we've met veterans from all services--and none have heard of or seen Americans. So here's the problem--why do we have all these reports of sightings?" Malyshev said, "I don't know what you're talking about. I worked with all POWs, Japanese, all, and I never met an American." Osipov asked, "In the '50s, was the Balkash Lager yours?" Raskin said, "I was there. It was specifically for POWs." Osipov said, "We have a report of an eyewitness who says there was an American." Colonel Herrington said, "One more question--can you help me? Since we have so many reports, and you say you would have known, what should I think? What is your opinion of this? Can you help me?" Malyshev answered, "In the case of foreigners, I repeat: there were no Americans. Who said this to you?" Osipov asked, "Were there no special secret camps?" Malyshev responded, "What? They were all secret. But not from the government. Why keep secrets from your own government?" Osipov said, "So there were no special camps? Or maybe the Americans just had numbers instead of names?" Malyshev said, "We had the documents. We had all of the details." MG Loeffke asked Osipov, "He [Malyshev] read all secret documents?" Osipov said, "He made an official statement to the effect."

8. Osipov next introduced Mr. Shuster, also a former MVD officer. Shuster said, "I worked in the system in the main directorate for POWs from April '44 until the end of the war. I served in Krasnogorsk, in the local main directorate. I never heard of one single American, not even from among those who served in Hitler's army. There was a lot of movement, they came through our camp from all over Europe, all of those who served in Hitler's army. But there were no Americans." Osipov asked, "Not one American?" Shuster said, "In our factories we had Flemings, Dutchmen, Swiss, even Spaniards. But there were no Americans." Osipov asked, "Not even German-Americans in Tambov?" Shuster said, "I didn't work in Tambov. And I must say an American anywhere would have been a sensation. Well, overall, I worked around POW issues up until 1973. After '56, with Adenauer and that deal, we freed the last war criminals. But they were repatriated in a given order. And, I remember, we sent the first lot through Frankfurt-an-der-Oder. Later lots moved through Moscow." Osipov asked, "And there were no Americans?" Shuster responded, "There were a couple of defectors from Berlin. But that's all in the official documents." MG Loeffke asked, "How many defectors?" Shuster answered, "A few." MG Loeffke asked, "What about special camps? For instance, you had 500,000 Japanese prisoners. They went home and some of them said they saw U.S. POWs." Shuster answered, "I knew nothing." Malyshev interjected, "We turned over all of the POWs--my office did. The Japanese were in Nakhodka...in Khabarovsk Krai. There were no special camps." LTC Osipov turned to MG Loeffke and said, "You never told us about the Japanese." MG Loeffke responded, "Yes, we did." Osipov asked, "And you have these documents?" MG Loeffke answered in the affirmative. Colonel Herrington then asked, "Do any of you gentlemen remember General Dzhadze? He ferried MIGs back and forth to Korea." Colonel Orlov spoke up and said, "No, I never heard of him." Colonel Herrington said, "He worked for Vassili Stalin." Orlov said, "I'll ask Vassili Stalin--he's still alive." Herrington asked, "Well, where did they get the MIG-15s?" Orlov said, "From the Soviet Union, of course. In 1951. One of our air divisions taught pilots from Korea and China." Al Graham of TFR asked, "Ambassador to Korea General Stikov--did his reports from Korea go straight to Stalin?" Orlov said, "Probably the Politburo--the Presidential Archives would have that answer."

9. MG Loeffke asked, "Colonel Korotkov, today we herd you say POWs were 'transferred through Khabarovsk."i Korotkov responded, "I suspect it's possible that the directorates for which these men worked weren't involved in these matters." Osipov asked, "You really think it happened through

Khabarovsk?" Korotkov answered, "I remember discussions, they said they'd brought some U.S. POWs. But I wasn't directly responsible. Still, these rumors seem to me not to be groundless." Osipov said, "It was really more than possible in that atmosphere." Korotkov said, "Yes. We can't say it couldn't have happened." MG Loeffke said, "Today we also heard from a former Chinese officer who himself gave POWs to the Russians--directly--what do you think of that?" Korotkov said, "Such a case is possible. Among the Americans were people who really could have interested our intelligence personnel." MG Loeffke said, "What about the two men you personally interrogated? They never came home. We debriefed all of our returnees, and they don't know anything about that." Korotkov said, "I can only say I was getting facts." Orlov interposed, stating, "As a rule, the interrogations weren't eye to eye meetings. I can't remember names--what interested me was your radar technology. I recall a young American was brought in--he was seated behind a wall. I wore a Chinese uniform--there were a lot of Russian emigres in China. Of course, the U.S. pilots knew that Soviet pilots were flying. And I especially said today that you didn't cover that important period in '51." Colonel Herrington said, "The Americans Colonels Korotkov and Orlov interrogated--we could account for them if we had the interrogation reports you wrote. Where might we find these reports?" Korotkov said, "Those documents probably don't exist, because I just assembled facts. But this process didn't result in permanent documents."

10. MG Loeffke said, "I'd like to thank the three veterans for their help and patience." Osipov said, "I ask our veterans--we in the Russian government want the truth. If you talk to friends, colleagues, please ask them about this." MG Loeffke asked, "Would they mind if we took a photo of them with Mr. Clift?" After a brief photo, the three Russian security service veterans left. A brief question and answer session followed with two Soviet officials with Vietnam-era experience, but neither man had anything new or insightful to offer. These officials were then also released and a more substantial discussion resumed with Colonels (retired) Orlov and Korotkov.

11. Colonel Herrington said, "I'd like to ask Colonels Korotkov and Orlov to please look carefully at the videotape after we leave, because we think this is convincing. Now, who else can we talk to?" Korotkov said, "I think these specialists and veterans you just heard are just officials who won't say anything. Let's follow another line--these guys who served back then are part and parcel of the old system. They worked their own little rows. Some wouldn't have known, others won't tell." Orlov said, "This Chinese officer, what he said was possible. But I doubt that other part about the trainloads in the rear." MG Loeffke said, "He said he did it a few times. Maybe there was a total of ten- fifteen people." Orlov responded, "I can't say. But the way you would have handled taking those pilots to the USSR--you would have done that by plane, not by train. Maybe two of them at a time. Look at two documents in your big book. Shtemenko forbid all contact with Americans. That was in December-January of '51- '52. But such contacts could have happened earlier. I didn't see it, but I can imagine it." Colonel Herrington asked, "Did either of you ever hear of a 'shopping list' of desired prisoners?" Orlov said, "I never saw such a list." Korotkov said, "Never. The KGB worked absolutely in isolation, separate from us."

12. MG Loeffke asked, "What must we do to find the truth? Give us a map." Orlov said, "Seek the documents from 1951." MG Loeffke said, "Some people say documents were destroyed--they believe it's best to ask people like you." Orlov said, "But maybe people don't tell the truth--Gajauskas, for instance." Loeffke said, "He gave us the details." Orlov said, "You know, Kalugin says he personally gave permission to interrogate Americans in Vietnam in '77, but no one could prove it." Colonel Herrington asked, "And the Vietnam question?" Orlov said, "I worked on the PVO main staff then. I know only technical details from Vietnam." Korotkov said, "There are two paths. Not all of the documents are open yet--I know there are documents they are not showing you. But I don't know exactly what has remained hidden." Orlov said, "Our archives are in total confusion. Nobody really knows it all, it's a mess. When I did my research in the Air Force Central Archives, they were a mess." Korotkov said, "You must find the right documents. A lot of documents are just stuck in boxes. I only want to say to you that the documentation from the 7th Directorate--the 7th Special Propaganda Department, which looked at the enemy--those documents aren't even available to us. That's one source. There are others, of course. Just plug away on the archives to which you have access. There are still lot's of veterans to talk to. You must meet with them and fill in the picture. Point three, we're stuck in Moscow and St. Petersburg. *Look in the regional archives*, like in Khabarovsk- -I don' t believe everything was destroyed. Try to get to Khabarovsk."

13. MG Loeffke asked, "What do you think about the document the Russians signed in the Chinese officer's presence, apparently receipting for the U.S. POWs?" Orlov said, "Maybe it was a copy of a translation of questions?" Korotkov asked, "Why do you only talk about pilots--there were lots of POWs from the 24th Division- Look at all of the possibilities. Look at ground troops, Navy." Orlov said, "We will find you some people who know something." Korotkov said, "Not only people--we'll find you documents."

14. Colonel Herrington asked, "What about the transfer through Manchouli?" Orlov said, "I don't think it was possible by train- -and so many, 450 per train. I don't understand. It doesn't make sense when we weren't at war--Stalin was very cautious about this war. Volkogonov wrote in an article that Stalin sent a telegram to stop the offensive when it went too far." Korotkov, however, said, "I think the trainloads were possible." Colonel Herrington said, "Perhaps there were small train shipments, two to four guys." Korotkov said, "Yes, they could have moved three or four guys by train." Orlov said, "But we have no facts." Colonel Herrington asked, "Colonel Korotkov, since you were in uniform for your interrogations--where do you think you were?" Korotkov said, "I don't know for sure. It's hard to say. It's a mountainous area, you couldn't see defining features. The boundaries weren't marked." Colonel Herrington asked, "Why do you think that none are alive today?" Korotkov said, "If they were alive anywhere, people would remember. You don't forget a thing like that." Colonel Herrington said, "You had a team of interrogators..." Korotkov said, "A section. In this region, in Khabarovsk, there were more than 100 specialists. Some had the opportunity to do interrogations--I was alone when I did mine. In about 1953, we got an order to put on civilian clothes." Colonel Herrington asked, "Can you estimate the number of Americans interrogated by your specialists?" Korotkov said, "The goal was to get maximum information. But I can't say how many."

[Note: Following these sessions, two of the participants made off-line remarks to Colonel Herrington and MG Loeffke individually. One participant stated that the American side was very close to proving the transfer issue on Korea. The second participant stated that the Korean War POW transfers "probably happened," but that the U.S. side still wasn't talking to the right people; further, the participant stated that many people, especially older people, are still afraid to talk today. Finally, this participant remarked that "It probably happened that the KGB took some POWs from Korea to the USSR, but it would have been a small number, not trainloads."]

ANNEX E TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA 27 Mar--16 Apr 93 BIWEEKLY REPORT

SUBJECT: Summary of Documents passed to the US Side of the Joint Commission on 8 Apr 93.

1. This annex contains summaries of three batches of documents passed to the US Side of the Joint Commission in Moscow on 8 Apr 93. This annex provides a "hot read-out" summary of the contents of the documents, without analysis, to inform Biweekly Report readers of the nature of the documents received. Names are generally transliterated directly from the Russian alphabet and have not yet been corrected and matched to the appropriate lists.

2. The documents are numbered TFR 36 through TFR 39 and contain the following numbers of pages: TFR 136 contains 59 pages of documents. TFR 137 contains 49 pages of documents. TFR 138 contains 351 pages of documents.

TFR 136 SUMMARY

TFR 136 contains 59 pages of documents dealing with the Vietnam Era.

TFR 136-1 to 136-3

Three page summarization of the 15 Sep 72 report to the Vietnamese Politburo by the Deputy Chief of the Vietnamese People's Army General Staff, Tran Van Quang, on American POWs. Unsigned and undated, but stamped with a CPSU Central Committee stamp dated 1 Dec 72.

TFR 136-4 to 136-10

Partial text of the report by General Tran Van Quang referenced in TFR 136-1. Many pages of this report appear to be missing. The report starts on page 17 and abruptly ends on page 22. These are the documents published by Izvestia and the NY Times on 10 and 12 April 93 respectively, and have become the focus of high interest.

TFR 136-11 to 136-14

Four page document dated 14 Mar 67 which states that there is a group of Soviet specialists in Vietnam collecting and analyzing captured U.S. equipment and technical documents. States that the Soviets have received over 700 pieces of US military equipment: to include parts of aircraft, missiles, radio electronics, photo reconnaissance, and other types of equipment. The Vietnamese say that the Soviets have received only 417 pieces. In spite of the great benefit to both the Soviet Union and North Vietnam of this group, the Vietnamese are making its work very difficult. States that when the Soviets go to a crash site, the trip is prolonged and round about. Says that the Chinese also get involved and are a hindrance to their work. Cites one example when the Soviets visited a site where an (improved model) reconnaissance aircraft crashed in January 1967. When they got there, the Chinese had already striped it of anything valuable and had prepared the aircraft remains for demolition. In order to smooth the Russians' ruffled feathers, the Vietnamese gave them a Shrike missile which they had been trying to get for a long time. States that the Vietnamese bureaucracy bogs down the specialists work. Takes from 2-3 months from when the equipment is collected before they can finally ship it to the Soviet Union. States that there are friendly relations with the Vietnamese. Says they get more done unofficially than through official channels by dealing with the individual as opposed to the bureaucracy. Apparently, there was an agreement between the Soviets and the Vietnamese that the Vietnamese were not adhering to closely. The Soviet specialists were to be informed monthly of the combat situation, aerial combats and be given the interrogation reports of captured American pilots and information on ECM effects against American missiles and aerial tactics. Sums up that something must be done to improve the ability of the Soviet specialists to do their work.

TFR 136-15 to 136-17

Excerpt from the diary of I.S. Shcherbakov, Soviet Ambassador to N. Vietnam. This excerpt is a three page transcript of a meeting with Nguyen Duy Chinh, dated 23 July 1970. Chinh is the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam. The Soviets originally requested to meet with Le Duan, but were told that Duan is ill. The Vietnamese were given a letter from Brezhnev offering assistance in constructing a mausoleum for Ho Chi Minh. There is discussion about the design and construction of the mausoleum, and whether or not Ho Chi Minh's body will be displayed during the 25th anniversary of the DRV celebration. States that the CC CPSU has agreed to accept Chan Khyu Zyk and Bin' Fyong [phonetic] into Moscow in August for medical treatment. Xuan Thui has returned from Paris and briefed the DRV government about the activities of the delegation he headed in Paris. The analysis of the latest steps of the Nixon Administration leads the Vietnamese to believe that Nixon may pull out 50 thousand American troops by October of this year, in connection with the US elections. The possibility of the withdrawal of 150 thousand American troops by Spring of next year remains for the Vietnamese simply words. The alleged letter by 89 American senators addressed to Pham Van Dong has still not been received, but the report about the letter has attracted Vietnamese interest. Nguyen thi Binh, Foreign Minister for the Provisional Revolutionary Council of the Republic of South Vietnam made a successful trip to India, in the opinion of both the North Vietnamese and the Soviets. Nguyen thi Binh will be leaving for a trip to Ceylon on the invitation of Sirimavo Bandarananke. Discussion about two South Vietnamese traitors and American attempts to use them in a "sensational disclosure." The USSR and Eastern European Dept. advisor Nguyen Tan, Dang Dich Khoi and USSR Embassy Attache Kuz'minov.

TFR 136-18 to 136-22

A five page memorandum, dated 1 September 1971, on the history and current status of US-Vietnamese contacts, from 31 March 1968 when Johnson discontinued bombing north of the 20th parallel to the date

of issue of the memorandum. On 26 July 71, Kissinger lays out a three phase plan to the North Vietnamese for stabilizing the situation in Vietnam. The first phase of the plan calls for a mutual declaration of principles. One of the points of this declaration is the release and return of all POWs.

TFR 136-22A to 50

Selective twenty-nine page excerpt from a political summary for the year 1970 by the USSR Embassy in North Vietnam. Discussion of how North Vietnam is integrating into the international socialist camp; of the evolution of Vietnamese political thought in relation to Soviet and Chinese thinking; about the economic climate, including a detailed account of Soviet financial and technical aid; and about Soviet military assistance. States that in a number of cases, the Vietnamese have begun to better inform the Soviets about actions taken and, as an example, states that the Soviets have been given lists of American POWs. Contains a table of foreign aid in rubles given by Socialist Countries to Vietnam, for the years 1970 and 1971 (expected). Discusses the lack of trust on the part of the Vietnamese and the obstacles that the Vietnamese set up which prevent better Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The document ends with conclusions and suggestions for improving the political and economic relations with Vietnam.

[Note: TFR 136-22A is a result of this page being skipped over during the initial numbering of the document.]

TFR 136-51 to 136-58

Excerpt from the diary of I.S. Shcherbakov, Soviet Ambassador to N. Vietnam. This excerpt is an eight page transcript of a meeting with Khoang Van Tien, dated 17 January 1973. Tien is the Deputy Foreign Minister of the DRV. Begins with overview of current political situation surrounding American involvement in Vietnam. Next is a description of the Kissinger - Le Duc Tho talks of 8-13 January 1973 concerning the wording, and signing and concerning various points of a treaty to be signed 27 January. This is followed by a discussion concerning whom the Vietnamese will inform about the contents of these talks. There is also a discussion about the situation in the other Indonesian countries and about Vietnamese-Cambodian relations. States that the Soviets are willing to assist in clearing North Vietnamese ports of mines. The Vietnamese believe that Washington should be responsible for this. The discussion ends with the Soviets asking how the Vietnamese will celebrate their victory. The Vietnamese answer that they are more occupied with ensuring that the US live up to the agreement, with attracting international assistance in rebuilding North and South Vietnam, and with making sure that the South Vietnamese revolution withstands to the end.

TFR 137 SUMMARY

TFR 137 contains 49 pages of documents. These documents deal primarily with the 2 Sep 58 shootdown of a USAF C-130 aircraft.

TFR 137-1 to 137-2

PVO Border Commander report dated 8 October 1952 to the Chiefs of Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Air Forces on the shootdown of a B-29 which violated the border near Ostrov Yurij on 7 October 1952.

TFR 137-3 to 137-4

Daily Activity Report for 29 July 1953 from VNOS Commander reporting violation of Soviet border at 0701-0704 near Cape Gamov by a foreign aircraft, a flying infraction at Limanskoe airfield, radar tracking of 18 foreign targets in the vicinity of Japan and notes of jamming at various Radio-technical Posts.

TFR 137-5 to 137-11

Board of Inquiry report dated 5 September 1958 to the CINC PVO on investigation of the violation and shootdown of a USAF C-130 on 2 Sep 58.

TFR 137-12

Translation from English of the Special TDY Order for the aircrew of the USAF C-130 shot down on 2 Sep 58.

TFR 137-13

Report dated 2 Sep 58 to CC CPSU on the violation/shootdown of an aircraft 15km southwest of Leninakan.

TFR 137-14 to 137-24

Gun camera photos of the USAF C-130 being shot down with analysis/interpretation reports dated 2 Sep 58.

TFR 137-25 to 137-35

Pictures of the USAF C-130 aircraft wreckage.

TFR 137-36 to 137-37

Technical supplement to Commission report dated 3 Sep 58 of exploitation analysis of the C-130 aircraft shot down on 2 Sep 58. Concludes that as result of crash, aircraft is unusable.

TFR 137-38 to 137-49

Photos of aircrew bodies, presumably from the 2 Sep 58 shootdown, at the crash site.

TFR 138 SUMMARY

TFR 138 contains 351 pages of documents. These documents all deal with reports of Soviet AAA units stationed in Korea during the Korean War. These documents contain numerous names of Soviet personnel who might provide an additional resource for Task Force Russia.

TFR 138-1

One page document dated either 30 or 31 Dec 1951 reporting the shootdown of a USAF F-80 aircraft by Soviet anti-aircraft artillery forces in Korea. The aircraft crashed into a lake, 2 km south of the village of Pakchen, which is 30 km south of the city of [Tojsen?]. Reports that there is no information on the aircrew.

TFR 138-2 to 138-4

Three page document dated 22 Jun 51 reporting the shootdown of a USAF F-80 on 22 Jun 51 at 0849 hrs. Aircraft was shot and sharply heeled over and then crashed. Does not specify anything about the aircrew. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-5 to 138-7

Three page document dated 11 Sep 52 reporting the shootdown of an USAF B-29 on 11 Sep 52 at 1123 hrs. No disposition on the aircrew.

TFR 138-8

One page document dated 3 Oct 51 listing the aircraft shootdowns for a three month period by FPN 43769. Lists 19 F-80's, 4 F-84's, 1 F-86 and 1 B-2[6?] as kills and 2 B-26's, 1 B-29 and 1 F-80 as probables. Gives dates and times of the shootdowns.

TFR 138-9 to 138-11

Three page document dated 12 Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of three F-80 "Shooting Stars" by FPN 43769 in the area of Ansyu. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-12

One page document dated 22 Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 by FPN 43769. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-13

One page document dated 13 Sep 52 asking that the three F-80's referenced in TFR 138-9 to 138-11 be added to the shootdown record of FPN 43769.

TFR 138-14

One page document dated 16 Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of three F-80's by FPN 43769. Asks that they be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-15

One page document dated 30 Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-86 by FPN 43769 on 11 Sep 51. Asks that it be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-16

One page document dated 17 Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 by FPN 43769 on 14 Sep 51. Asks that it be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-17

One page document dated 16 Sep 51 reporting the crash site and witnesses of the aircraft referenced in TFR 138-16.

TFR 138-18

One page document dated 21 Sep 51 reporting the crash site and witnesses of an aircraft that was shot down on 12 Sep 51.

TFR 138-19

One page document dated Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of one B-26 by FPN 43769 on 21 Sep 51. Asks that it be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-20

One page document dated Oct 51 giving the circumstances of the B-26 referenced in TFR 138-19. Aircraft was under control when last seen but was descending and dropped off the radar screens.

TFR 138-21

One page document dated 18 Oct 51 giving supporting evidence for the B-26 shootdown referenced in TFR 138-19.

TFR 138-22 to 138-23

Two page document dated 27 Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 by FPN 43769 on 25 Sep 51. Asks that it be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-24 to 138-26

Three page document dated 27 Sep 51 mentioning three individuals in dispatches for their role in shooting down a B-26 on 26 Sep 51 and the circumstances of the shootdown. This aircraft was apparently shot down by FPN 17343 and crashed in the mountains 20-40 km north of Tajsen. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-27 to 138-28

Two page document dated 29 Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 by FPN 43769 on 26 Sep 51. Asks that it be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-29 to 138-31

Three page document dated 7 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one B-26 by FPN 43769 on 27 Sep 51. Asks that it be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Possibly listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-32 to 138-34

Three pages of documents dated Sep and Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 by FPN 43769 on 27 Sep 51. Asks that it be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-35 to 138-37

Three pages of documents dated Sep 51 reporting an additional shootdown of one F-80 by FPN 43769 on 27 Sep 51. Asks that it be added to the shootdown record. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-38

One page document dated 30 Sep 51 reporting the shootdown of two F-80 Shooting Stars on 28 Sep 51 by FPN 43769. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-39

One page document dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 on 2 Oct 51 by FPN 17343. No aircrew disposition. Not listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-40

One page document dated 3 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of two F-80 Shooting Stars on 2 Oct 51 by FPN 43769. States that both aircraft crashed into the bay, an allied patrol boat made an unsuccessful attempt to recover them and the pilots subsequently perished. Not listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-41

One page document dated 2 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one jet aircraft on 2 Oct 51. Reports that the pilot parachuted from the aircraft. Not listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-42 to 138-43

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of three F-80 Shooting Stars on 2 Oct 51 by FPN 43769. States all three aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition. Listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-44 to 138-45

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the probable shootdown of one B-29 on 3 Oct 51 by FPN 43769. No aircrew disposition. Probably listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-46 to 138-47

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 Shooting Star on 3 Oct 51 by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition. Not listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-48 to 138-49

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 3 Oct 51 by FPN 43769. States the aircraft was numbered 22053 and crashed near the city of Suchen. No aircrew disposition. Not listed on TFR 138-8.

TFR 138-50 to 138-52

Three pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 on 3 Oct 51 by FPN 43769. States that the aircraft crashed near the island of Sin-Ry. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-53 to 138-55

Three pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 on 7 Oct 51 by FPN 43769. Gives serial number etc. extracted from a plate on the aircraft. Reports that they were unable to find the pilot.

TFR 138-56 to 138-57

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 Shooting Star on 7 Oct **51 at 0846 hrs by** FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-58 to 138-59

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 Shooting Star on 7 Oct 51 at 1551 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-60 to 138-64

Five pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of 6 F-80 aircraft and the probable damaging of an additional two on 8 Oct 51 by FPN 17343. Five of the six aircraft crashed into the water, the remaining one into a rice field. States that four of the pilots parachuted, one crashed with the burning plane and one was found dead at the crash site. Not clear if the one that crashed with the burning plane is the same as the one that was found at the crash site. The fate of the pilots who parachuted is unknown.

TFR 138-65 to 138-66

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 Shooting Star on 10 Oct 51 at 1656 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft disappeared, trailing smoke, in a northeasterly direction. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-67 to 138-68

Two pages of documents dated 18 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 11 Oct 51 at 0956 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft flew towards the bay and crashed. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-69 to 138-70

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of two F-84's on 12 Oct 51 at 1630 hrs by FPN 43769.

TFR 138-71 to 138-72

States the aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-73 to 138-75

Two pages of documents dated 18 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 12 Oct 51 at 1000 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-76 to 138-78

Three pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 Shooting Star on 12 Oct 51 at 1000 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-79 to 138-80

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 Shooting Star on 12 Oct 51 at 1600 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed into the bay near Lib-Sek. No aircrew disposition.

[Note: TFR 138 was mistakenly numbered. After TFR 138-80 the numbers TFR 138-71 to 138-80 were used again. Rather than renumbering the entire document from TFR 138-80 on, a "*" was added to the numbers that are repeated to indicate their uniqueness.]

TFR 138-71*

One page document dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 Shooting Star on 14 Oct 51 at approximately 1601 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed near Lip-Sek. No aircrew disposition. Very similar to shootdown in TFR 138-79 to 138-80, date might be a typo.

TFR 138-72* to 73*

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-80 Shooting Star on 12 Oct 51 at 1605 hrs by FPN 43769. Aircraft was serial number No. 30 F 03407-11. States the aircraft crashed near Lit-Sen and that the pilot parachuted and was taken by the North Koreans.

TFR 138-74* to 75*

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 12 Oct 51 at 1658 hrs by FPN 43769. Aircraft was serial number Nø 1341,8-50. One of the aircraft's bombs exploded when it crashed. References articles found in the wreckage but nothing on the pilot.

TFR 138-76*

One page document dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 14 Oct 51 at approximately 1650 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed near Lip-Sek. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-77* to 78*

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 12 Oct 51 at 1630 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed near Lip-Sek. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-79*

One page document dated 15 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one B-26 on 13 Oct 51 at 2055 hrs probably by FPN 17343 near the city of [Kadek?]. Fate of aircrew is unknown.

TFR 138-80*

One page document dated 22 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 12 Oct 51 at approximately 1625 hrs by FPN 43769. States the aircraft crashed near Lip-Sek. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-81

One page document dated Oct 51 transferring documents related to the shootdown of one B-26 on 13 Oct 51. Probably the B-26 referenced in TFR 138-79*.

TFR 138-82

One page document dated 23 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 22 Oct 51 by FPN 17343. States the aircraft exploded in mid-air. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-83

One page document dated 23 Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 22 Oct 51 by FPN 17343. States the aircraft exploded in mid-air. No aircrew disposition. Possibly same aircraft referenced in TFR 138-82.

TFR 138-84 to 138-85

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of two F-80 Shooting Stars on 22 Oct 51 by FPN 17343.

No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-86 to 138-88

Three pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of two B-29's on 23 Oct 51 at 0842 hrs. One of the B-29's was shot down by FPN 43769 and the other one was shot down by MIG-15's. Both bombers crashed into the bay, 16 km from shore. Twenty minutes after the crash, three helicopters showed up and circled over the crash site and then departed. Aircrew disposition unclear.

TFR 138-89 to 138-90

Two pages of documents dated Oct 51 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 25 Oct 51 at 1628 hrs probably by FPN 17343. States the aircraft exploded in mid-air. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-91

One page document dated 28 Oct 51 transferring documents from FPN 17343 to FPN 12230 which attest to the shootdowns of 6 aircraft between 22 Oct-25 Oct 51 by FPN 17343.

TFR 138-92

One page document dated 17 Nov 51 reporting the shootdown of one B-29 on 8 Nov 51 at 2306 hrs by

FPN 43769. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-93

One page document dated Nov 51 transferring documents from FPN 17343 to FPN 12230 regarding the 12 Nov 51 shootdown of a B-26 by FPN 17343.

TFR 138-94 to 138-95

Two pages of documents dated 12 Nov 51 reporting the shootdown of the B-26 referenced in TFR 138-93.

TFR 138-96

One page document dated 17 Nov 51 reporting the shootdown of one B-29 on 8 Nov 51 at 2306 hrs by FPN 43769. No aircrew disposition. Probably the same aircraft referenced in TFR 138-92.

TFR 138-97 to 138-98

Photograph of a tail section of what appears to be a fighter aircraft with USAF markings and number 92414. Inscription reads: wreckage of the aircraft shot down on 8 Oct 51 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343 at the crash site in the area of Tehsiyu at quadrant 4634[1?].

TFR 138-99 to 104

Six pages of documents regarding a B-29 shot down by the 3rd Battery of FPN 17343 on 29 Jan 52. States aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-105 to 107

Three pages of documents regarding a F-84 shot down by the 7th Battery of FPN 43769 on 30 Jan 52 at approximately 1417 hrs. Aircraft crashed into the sea. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-108 to 109

Two pages of documents dated Feb 52 reporting the shootdown of a B-26 on 13 Feb 52 by the 8th Battery of FPN 17343. Aircraft crashed into the bay. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-110 to 112

Three pages of documents dated Feb 52 reporting the shootdown of a F-84 on 19 Feb 52 by the 7th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft exploded and crashed near the village of Sinkimri. Parts of the pilot's body were found at the crash site along with various parts of the aircraft.

TFR 138-113 to 116

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of a F-84 on 25 May 52 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft exploded 17 KM southwest of the city of Sakusiyu-Daikan. Parts of the pilot's body were found at the crash site. Included in these documents are what appears to be a rubbing of a metal plate which was attached to a part of the aircraft and a sketch map of the crash site.

TFR 138-117 to 120

Four pages of documents dated 28 May 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 25 May 1952 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed in a forest [9?] kilometers southwest of the city of Sakusiyu-Daikan. The local inhabitants buried the remains of the burned pilot 4 meters from the crash

site.

TFR 138-121 to 124

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 25 May 52 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed SW of the city Sakusyu-[cut-off]. Parts of the pilot's body were found at the crash site. Included in these documents are what appears to be a rubbing of a metal plate which was attached to a part of the aircraft and a sketch map of the crash site.

TFR 138-125 to 128

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 25 May 52 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed approximately 21 kilometers SW of the city Sakusyu-Daikan. Parts of the pilot's body were found at the crash site. Included in these documents are what appears to be a rubbing of a metal information plate which was attached to a part of the aircraft and a sketch map of the crash site.

TFR 138-129 to 132

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 13 May 52 by the 1st Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed into a hill near the city Tehpen. Neither the pilot nor the ejection seat were found at the crash site. Included in these documents are what appears to be a rubbing of a metal information plate which was attached to a part of the aircraft.

TFR 138-133 to 137

Five pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 9 May 52 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed approximately 21 -kilometers SW of the city Sakusyu-Daikan. Parts of the pilot's body were found at the crash site. Included in these documents are what appears to be a rubbing of a metal information plate which was attached to a part of the aircraft, a sketch map of the crash site and document fragments.

TFR 138-138 to 142

Five pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of two F-51 on 9 May 52 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343. The report states that a total of four aircraft were shot down during this battle but this report is primarily about these two F-51's. One of the aircraft crashed into the bay, 4-5 kilometers from the shore and was unrecoverable and gives no aircrew disposition. The second aircraft crashed 30-40 meters from the shore near the village of [Soichenkui Sonchenmen?]. States that the pilot burned with the plane. Also included in these documents are what appears to be a rubbing of a metal information plate which was attached to a part of the aircraft and a sketch map of the crash sites.

TFR 138-143 to 147

Five pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of one F-51 on 9 May 52 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed in a rice field near the village of Nongari. The pilot burned with the aircraft and his remains were buried by the local residents. Included is a sketch map of the crash site.

TFR 138-148 to 151

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of one F-84E on 2 May 52 by the 7th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed near Khean at the mouth of the Chenchengan River. Included is a rubbing of a metal information plate which was attached to a part of the aircraft and a sketch map of the crash site. States that the pilot was not found.

TFR 138-152 to 155

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of one F-51 on 2 May 52 by the 8th Battery of FPN 17343. Aircraft crashed 9 km from the village of Osan-li in the sea. Included is a sketch map of the crash site. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-156 to 159

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of two F-51's on 2 May 52 at 1228 hrs by the 5th Battery of FPN 17343. The first F-51 crashed 13 km southwest of Osan-li and 5 km from shore; the second F-51 crashed 10-12 km west of Osan-li and 5 km from shore. Sketch map of one of the crash sites included. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-160 to 163

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 2 May 52 at 0830 hrs by the 8th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed west of the settlement of Tuk-on-men, 3-4 km from shore. Sketch map of one of the crash sites included. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-164 to 166

These appear to be more documents on the shootdown of two F-51's summarized in TFR 138-156 to 159. No new information.

TFR 138-167 to 173

Seven pages of documents dated Oct 52 reporting the shootdown of one F-86 on 7 Oct 52 by the 2nd and 3rd Batteries of FPN 43769. Aircraft crashed 8-10 km south of the Island of Sinbi-to. Pilot crashed with the aircraft.

TFR 138-174 to 177

Four pages of documents dated Sep 52 reporting the shootdown of one B-29 on 13 Sep 52 at 0100 hrs by the 3rd and 4th Batteries of FPN 17343. The B-29 crashed 8-10 km from shore near Sezhsezh. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-178 to 181

Four pages of documents dated Apr 52 reporting the shootdown of one B-26 on 21 Apr 52 at 0429 by units of FPN 17343. Aircraft crashed 10 km from shore. At 0700 hrs, 3 helicopters escorted by 3 F-51's were seen at the crash site. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-182 to 185

Four pages of documents dated April/May 52 which report on the crash sites of three F-84's, one F-86 and one F-51 on 21 Apr 52 by the 7th and 8th batteries of FPN 43769. 1) one F-84 along with its pilot crashed at 0910 hrs into the sea, 8 km from the shore, southwest of Kounsan, 2) one F-51 crashed along with its pilot at 1620 hrs into the sea southwest of the village of Lichto, 4 km from the shore, 3) Two F-84's along with their pilots crashed at 1625 hrs into the sea southwest of the village {Khanmri?], 6 kilometers from the shore and 4) One F-86 crashed at 1740 hrs into the sea, southwest of the city of Tensyu, 16 km from shore. Document states that the fate of the F-86 pilot is unknown. Also included in this set of documents is a summary sheet of the crash sites of aircraft shot down by FPN 12230, to whom FPNs 17343 and 43769 are subordinate, during May 1952. Gives crash site for 12 F-84's, 6 F-51's, 3 B-26's and 1 F-86.

TFR 138-186 to 189

Four pages of documents dated Apr 52 which report on the crash sites of three F-84's and one F-51 on 18 Apr 52 by units of FPN 43769. 1) Two F-84's shot down at 0732 hrs crashed along with their pilots into the sea, 8 km from shore, 2) One F-84 shot down at 0853 hrs crashed along with its pilot into the sea, 4 km from shore, 3) One F-51 shot down at 1210 hrs crashed along with its pilot into the sea, 12 km from shore. Also reports on a F-84 that was shot down at 1330 hrs on 18 Apr 52 which crashed into the sea. The pilot of this aircraft ejected and was picked up by a helicopter.

TFR 138-190 to 194

Five pages of documents dated Apr 52 which report on the shoot down of one B-26 on 13 Apr 52 at 0331 hrs which crashed into the Korea Bay and sank. No aircrew disposition. Also included are three sketch maps showing the flight route of B-26 attacks and AAA sites.

TFR 138-195 to 196

Two pages of documents dated Apr 52,! reporting the shootdown of one F-84 on 9 Apr 52 at 1050 hrs by the 8th Battery of FPN 43769. Aircraft crashed into the Korea Bay along with its pilot.

TFR 138-197 to 198

Two pages of documents dated Apr 52 reporting the shootdown of two F-84's and one F-51 on 9 Apr 52. All aircraft sank along with their aircrews in the Korea Bay.

TFR 138-199 to 202

Four pages of documents dated Apr 52 reporting the shootdown of four F-51s on 9 Apr 52 by the 5th Battery of FPN 17343 and the 8th Battery of FPN 43769. The aircraft crashed into the bay or on an island in the bay. The crews went down with their planes.

TFR 138-203 to 204

Two pages of documents dated Apr 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 2 Apr 52 by the 5th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed into the bay near Kasan. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-205 to 206

Two pages of documents dated Apr 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 6 Apr 52 by the 5th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed into the bay. Local authorities of the city Tansyu have confirmed the shootdown. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-207 to 208

Two pages of documents dated Feb 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 22 Feb 52 by the 6th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed 4 kilometers east of the city Tejsyu. The pilot was not found at the crash site.

TFR 138-209 to 210

Two pages of documents dated Feb 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 19 Feb 52 by the 4th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed in the Takchen area. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-211 to 213

Three pages of documents dated Feb 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 19 Feb 52 by the 7th Battery of FPN 17343. The aircraft crashed in the western sea together with its crew.

TFR 138-214 to 217

Four pages of documents dated May 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 17 May 52 by the 8th Battery of FPN 83554. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay 2-3 kilometers from shore. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-218 to 221

Four pages of documents dated Jan 52 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 5 Jan 52 by the 3rd Battery of FPN 83554. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. Aircrew disposition unclear, but pilot probably ejected [bad copy].

TFR 138-222 to 225

Four pages of documents dated Jan 52 reporting the shootdown of an B-29 on 11 Jan 52 by the 2nd Battery of FPN 61885. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay in the area of Singisyu. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-226 to 229

Four pages of documents dated Jun 53 reporting the shootdown of two F-86's on 13 Jun 53 by the 1st and 2nd Batteries of FPN 61885. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay in the area of Un-Do Island. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-230 to 233

Four pages of documents dated Jun 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 16 Jun 53 by the 1st Battery of FPN 92851. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay in the area of Sinbi-to Island. Two sketch maps of the crash site are included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-234 to 236

Four pages of documents dated Jun 53 reporting the shootdown of two RF-80's on 17 Jun 53 by the 2nd Battery of FPN 61885. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay in the area of Samkot-Som Island. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No aircrew disposition. The witness' confirmation of the stated crash, states that there was a search group located in the area of Charengvan searching for pilot who parachuted on 16 Jun 53.

TFR 138-237 to 241

Four pages of documents dated Jun 53 reporting the shootdown of two F-86's on 18 Jun 53 by the 2nd Battery of FPN 92851. The aircraft crashed 20 kilometers south of the city Enampo. Two sketch maps of the crash site are included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-242 to 245

Four pages of documents dated Jun 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 18 Jun 53 by the 1st Battery of FPN 92851. The aircraft crashed 30-40 kilometers south of Tosado. Two sketch maps of the crash site are included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-246 to 249

Four pages of documents dated Jun 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 19 Jun 53 by the 3rd Battery of FPN 92851. The aircraft crashed near Koken-to Island. Two sketch maps of the crash site are included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-250 to 254

Five pages of documents dated Jun 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 29 Jun 53 by the 4th Battery of FPN 61855. The aircraft crashed near Un-Do Island. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-255 to 259

Five pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 10 Jul 53 by the 7th Battery of FPN 83554. The aircraft crashed 10 kilometers north-west of Sunchon. Two sketch maps of the crash site are included in these documents. The charred remains of the pilot were found at the crash site.

TFR 138-260 to 263

Four pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 18 Jul 53 by the 4th Battery of FPN 61885. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay. Two sketch maps of the crash site are included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-264 to 266

Three pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-80 on 25 Jul 53 by the 2nd Battery of FPN 61885. The aircraft crashed 8 kilometers south-east of Senton-do. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-267 to 269

Three pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 19 Jul 53 by the 3rd Battery of FPN 61885. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay near Sok-Som Island. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. The pilot was observed parachuting from the plane.

TFR 138-270 to 271

Two pages of documents dated May 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 of the 51st Air Group on 27 May 53 by the 4th Battery of FPN 92851. The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay near Tsjo-to. No crew disposition.

TFR 138-272 to 274

Three pages of documents dated Feb 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-84 on 20 Feb 53 by the 4th Battery of FPN 61885.

The aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No crew disposition.

TFR 138-296 to 297

Two pages of documents dated May 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 14 May 53 by the 3rd Battery of FPN 61885. The aircraft crashed near the shore south of Namsi. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No crew disposition.

TFR 138-298 to 299

Two pages of documents dated May 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 23 May 53 by the 3rd Battery of FPN 61885. The aircraft crashed near the island of Cham-do. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No crew disposition.

TFR 138-300 to 302

Three pages of documents dated May 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 23 May 53 by the 8th Battery of FPN 88554. The aircraft crashed while traveling from Singisyu to Sanchkhon. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No crew disposition.

TFR 138-303 to 304

Two pages of documents dated May 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 26 May 53. No crew disposition.

TFR 138-305 to 306

Two pages of documents dated May 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 27 May 53. The aircraft crashed near Sinbi-to. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. The pilot ejected near Sinbi-to.

TFR 138-307 to 308

Two pages of documents dated Jun 53 reporting the shootdown of an F-86 on 13 Jun 53 by the 4th Battery of FPN 83554. The aircraft crashed 40-50 kilometers from the river Yalutszyan. A sketch map of the crash site is included in these documents. No crew disposition.

TFR 138-309 to 310

Two pages of documents reporting the shootdown of one F-86 on 16 Jun 53 at 1820 hrs. States that the pilot was captured by the Chinese. Included is a sketch map of the crash site.

TFR 138-311 to 315

Five pages of documents reporting the shootdown of one F-86 on 19 Jun 53 between 0700-0800 hrs by FPN 83554. States that the pilot was captured by the Chinese. Included are two sketch maps of the crash site.

TFR 138-316 to 317

Two page document reporting the shootdown and crash of one F-86 near Nabzom on 19 July 53. Aircraft crashed into the sea and the pilot was seen to eject and parachute. Capture of the pilot not indicated.

TFR 138-318 to 320

Three page document dated 24 Jul 53 finding that an F-86 was shot down by FPN 61885 and crashed on 19 Jul 53 at 1616 hrs. Aircraft crashed with its pilot on the shore near Tasato. Sketch map of crash site included.

TFR 138-321 to 324

Four pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown and crash of one F-86 by FPN 83554 on 20 Jul 53 at 1625 hrs. The pilot ejected and was captured by Chinese volunteers. Tail number of the F-86 was 12756, factory number was 28637. Includes two sketch maps.

TFR 138-325 to 326

Two pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown and crash of one F-86 on 7 Jul 53 at 1607 hrs. Aircraft crashed in the sea, 15 KM west of Siinbi-to Island. No aircrew disposition. Includes one sketch map.

TFR 138-327 to 329

Three pages of documents dated 21 Jul 53 reporting the shootdown and crash of one F-86 on 20 Jul 53 at 1624 hrs. Aircraft crashed near Kadzi-to Island. Pilot ejected from the aircraft and landed in the bay. No final disposition on pilot. Includes two sketch maps, one of which shows the flight plan of a B-29 at 0158 hrs on 21 Jul 53 and should belong with TFR 138-300 below.

TFR 138-330

One page document dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown and crash of one B-29 on 21 Jul 53 at 0158 hrs. Aircraft possibly crashed near the observation point at Pinsha Van Di-Syan. No aircrew disposition.

TFR 138-331 to 332

Two pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown and crash of one F-80 on 27 Jul 53 at 1700 hrs. Aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay. No aircrew disposition. Includes one sketch map.

TFR 138-333 to 334

Two pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown and crash of one F-86 on 22 Jul 53 at 1341 hrs. Aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay, 3 KM offshore. No aircrew disposition. Includes one sketch map.

TFR 138-335 to 338

Four pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown and crash of one F-86 on 27 Jul 53 at 1605 hrs. Aircraft crashed 3 km northeast of Sin-Do Island. No aircrew disposition. Also reports the shootdown and crash of one F-84 on 27 Jul 53 at 1315 hrs. The F-84 crashed 4-5 km west of Senridon into the bay. The ejection of the pilot was observed. Ultimate disposition of the pilot unknown. Includes two sketch maps, one for each crash.

TFR 138-339 to 340

Two pages of documents dated Jul 53 reporting the shootdown and crash of one F-86 on 27 Jul 53 at 1607 hrs. Aircraft crashed in the Korea Bay, 3 KM offshore after passing over Sin-Do Island. No aircrew disposition. Includes one sketch map of crash site.

ANNEX F TO TASK FORCE RUSSIA BIWEEKLY REPORT, 27 MAR-16 APR 1993

SUBJECT: ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF TASK FORCE RUSSIA (JULY 1992-20 April 1993)

General: Task Force Russia, consisting of 44 personnel (6 in Pentagon, 28 in Washington, and 10 in Moscow), provides Department of Defense support to the Joint U.S./Russian Task Force on POW/MIA affairs to obtain information on unaccounted-for American servicemen on the territory of the former Soviet Union. To that end, the Task Force collects and analyzes information contained in Russian and U.S. archives, in conjunction with relevant information volunteered by Russian citizens or other knowledgeable persons. Task Force efforts are focused on four wars in the following order of priority: (1) Vietnam, (2) Korea, (3) the Cold War, and (4) World War II.

Since the unit's inception on 29 June 1992 (by directive of the Secretary of Defense), TFR has had significant accomplishments, categorized by written products, archival searches, interviews, and press releases, as summarized below.

Written products:

- Eighteen (18) Biweekly Reports (beginning 17 July 1992 to the present) summarize TFR's activities, highlight key documents, and provide direction to future TFR events.

- TFR received over 7,000 Russian language pages of documents from all sources. In excess of 2,500 pages have been translated. Four translation publications providing compendiums of verbatim translations (July, September, October 92, February 93), cover over 1,000 documents (including documents released from all Russian archival sources, newspaper articles, and personal letters to TFR from Russian citizens).

- TFR translators played an integral part in the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army's meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army in Alaska (Feb 93), and provided linguistic support for two additional high level Russian dignitaries visiting the United States.

- Two analytical reports provided insights into Russian perspectives on the POW/MIA issue, and insights into the U.S. POW graves in Sakhalin and southern Kurils.

In Preparation for the April 93 Joint Commission meeting in Moscow, two additional documents were prepared: (1) an analysis of key findings based on Russian archival releases, which formed the basis for future document release; a book of case studies on U.S. POWs/MIAs during the Korean and Cold War periods.

Additionally, TFR produced a twenty-minute video entitled *Korean War POW Transfers to the Soviet Union: Eyewitnesses,* highlighted film records of interviews with U.S., Chinese and ex-Soviet eyewitnesses. This video, with English and Russian transcript, was shown during the April Joint Commission meeting.

Archival searches in the U.S.:

Dr. Trudy Peterson and Dr. Richard Jacobs facilitated an exhaustive search of U.S. Archives materials (including the so-called "Klaus files") at Washington and Suitland by TFR analysts.

Additionally, TFR analysts recently visited the Center for Military History (Washington, DC); US Army Central Security Facility Intelligence Records Repository at Et Meade; and Center for Cryptologic History at NSA for information on Cold War and Korean War data. They also travelled to Carlisle Barracks (PA), National Personnel Records Center (St Louis), and to the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, for additional data.

Interviews conducted at TFR-H include: John Noble, Steve Kiba, Mark Sauter, James Sanders, Michael Van Atta, and Yuri Pankov, all of whom provided useful data on the fate of unaccounted-for American servicemen.

Field Interviews conducted by TFR-H personnel include: Ted Landreth (Los Angeles); Avraham Shifrin (Israel); Povilas Peciulaitis (Lithuanian) (Cleveland); Mr. Ping Hwa Xu (San Jose, California); and LTC Phillip Corso (USA, Retired) (2x) (Washington, DC).

Activities of TFR-M Personnel (Moscow):

TFR-M is responsible for all POW/MIA activities within Russia and the republics of the former Soviet Union, to include: Commission Meeting preparation and execution, liaison with State Department, visitor control, visits to Russian archival centers, and interviews. To date, Moscow conducted over 200 interviews, and presently averages five interviews a week.

Several recent interviews include:

- Yuri A. Dulensky, head of the Tambov regional archive that holds the fond listings for the NKVD prison 188 archives (12 March, p. 3).

- TFR interviewed and videotaped Lithuanian parliamentarian Balys Gajauskas in Vilnius, who elaborated on his assertion to have encountered two Americans in the GULag during the 1950's (26 March, p. 4).

- Andrew Khaziyev of Tambov Television Studio interviewed TFR-M team for later broadcast, during which time TFR-M explained the mission and work of the Joint Commission and appealed to local residents for information (12 March, p. 3).

- Vladimir I Korotayev, Deputy Director of the Russian Central Historical Documentary Collection, who provided TFR-M with personnel data cards on eleven alleged U.S. POWs from the archive's WW II repatriation file, which will be analyzed (12 March, p. 5).

Additional activities conducted by TFR:

- Preparation for Joint Commission meetings (Sep, Dec, Apr 93)

- Developed detailed briefing on Sanderson case; presented to April 93 Joint Commission meeting in Moscow's Kremlin.

- Supported Congressional hearings in Washington (11 Nov 92).

- Trip to the Ukraine in Jan 93 followed up on report of a possible former U.S. POW.

- Two-month trip to Russia (Nov and Dec 92) supplemented TFR-M staff.

- Discussions with family members resulted in additional information, photographs, and leads for an expanded interview program.

- Answered questions under Freedom of Information Act (two ongoing actions).

- Coordinated with National Archives, CDO, CIA, and State to declassify portions of "Klaus files."

- Worked with DoD PAO and reporters for US News and World Report to ensure accurate story in 15 March 93 issue on Cold War shootdowns.

- Provided computer support to TFR-Moscow.

- Scanned Russian and English language TFR documents to provide historical record of activities.

- Developed pass-on books outlining responsibilities of individual analysts to provide TFR continuity in light of significant personnel turnover during next 90 days.

Advertising: Press releases developed and approved for at least six publications, including: *Army Reserve Magazine; Svoboda; Ukrainian Weekly; Independent Paper from Russia; Nezavecimaya Gazeta;* and Russian language newspapers in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

As a direct result of advertising, 10 citizens of a Baltic country have voluntarily provided additional information pertinent to the U.S. POW/MIA issue. These interviews have resulted in 12 additional leads (callers and letters), currently being evaluated.

Projected activities:

- Trip to Sakhalin with Russians to search for possible WW II grave sites.

- Expand interview program in Russia and republics of the former Soviet Union.

- Expand Russian archival searches to include holdings at Podolsk, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and St. Petersburg.

- Approved press release will appear in *Krasnaya Zvezda* five times, commencing 25 April.